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TRANSFORMING AT-WILL
EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES
INTO WRONGFUL
DISCHARGE CLAIMS:
FERTILE GROUND FOR ADR
Mary A. Bedikiant
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the employment-at-will rule2 has been whittled away by
legislative enactments and case law.3 Courts, once reticent about disturbing the
1. Regional Vice-President, American Arbitration Association; Adjunct Professor of Law,
University of Detroit Mercy School of Law and Wayne State University Law School. B.A. Wayne
State University, 1971; M.A. (Political Science) Wayne State University, 1975; J.D. Detroit College
of Law, 1980. The author gratefully acknowledges the comments of Robert A. McCormick and
Richard J. Seryak and the research assistance of Jay E..Johnson and Patrick G. Seyferth. The views
expressed in this Article are exclusively those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position
or views of the American Arbitration Association.
2. "Employment-at-will" means that employment relationships of unspecified duration are
presumed to be at the will of either the employee or employer. Either party may, without legal
consequence, terminate the relationship without notice and for good cause, bad cause, or even cause
that is morally wrong. Payne v. Western & At. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 518 (1884), overruled on other
grounds by Hutton v. Waters, 179 S.W. 134 (Tenn. 1915); see infra notes 17-19 and accompanying
text.
3. Only Montana and Puerto Rico have statutes preventing the discharge of employees without
just cause. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to -914 (1987); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit 29, § 185a-i
(1985). The additional panoply of protections has been accomplished through case law, workers'
compensation, or whistleblowers' legislation. Alabama: ALA. CODE § 25-5-11.1 (1992) (prohibiting
the termination of an employee who sues to recover workers' compensation or files notification of a
safety violation); Alaska: Jones v. Central Peninsula Gen. Hosp., 779 P.2d 783 (Alaska 1989) (an
employee manual can modify an employment-at-will relationship); Arizona: Leikvold v. Valley View
Community Hosp., 688 P.2d 170 (Ariz. 1984) (an employee manual can form the basis of an
exception to the at-will doctrine); Arkansas: Sterling Drug v. Oxford, 743 S.W.2d 380 (Ark. 1988)
(at-will employee cannot be terminated for reporting violation of the law); California: Petermann v.
International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 396, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959) (employee cannot be
terminated for refusing to give false testimony before a legislative committee); Colorado: Continental
Air Lines v. Keenan, 731 P.2d 708 (Colo. 1987) (at-will employee may enforce termination procedure
of handbook under implied contract theory or promissory estoppel); Connecticut: Schmidt v. Yardney
Elec. Corp., 492 A.2d 512 (Conn. App. Ct. 1985) (retaliatory discharge for reporting employer's
fraud is actionable); Delaware: Heller v. Dover Warehouse Mkt., 515 A.2d 178 (Del. 1986)
(employee required to take polygraph exam in contravention of state law has cause of action for
wrongful discharge); Florida: Smith v. Piezo Technology & Professional Adm'rs, 427 So. 2d 182
(Fla. 1983) (Florida recognizes a cause of action for discharge of employee for filing workers'
HeinOnline -- 1993 J. Disp. Resol. 113 1993
114 JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 1993, No. 1
compensation claim); Georgia: No modification; Hawaii: Parnar v. Americana Hotels, 652 P.2d 625
(Haw. 1982) (discharge for refusing to commit an illegal act is recognized as a public policy exception
to the at-will doctrine); Idaho: Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 563 P.2d 54 (Idaho 1977)
(employee may claim damages for wrongful discharge if discharge violates public policy); Illinois:
Shores v. Senior Manor Nursing Ctr., 518 N.E.2d 471 (I91. App. Ct. 1988) (Plaintiff's discharge for
reporting poor performance on the job violates public policy); Indiana: Perry v. Hartz Mountain
Corp., 537 F. Supp. 1387 (S.D. Ind. 1982) (court refused to dismiss claim of employee discharged
for declining to participate in restraint of trade scheme); Iowa: McBride v. Sioux City, 444 N.W.2d
85 (Iowa 1989) (employee handbook may create a unilateral contract); Kansas: Kristler v. Life Care
Ctrs. of Am., 620 F. Supp. 1268 (D. Kan. 1985) (employee terminated for testifying against former
employer at unemployment compensation hearing can state cause of action for retaliatory discharge);
Kentucky: Firestone Textile Co. Div. v. Meadows, 666 S.W.2d 730 (Ky. 1983) (employee
discharged for pursuing workers' compensation benefits has cause of action for wrongful discharge);
Louisiana: Ducote v. J.A. Jones Constr. Co., 471 So. 2d 704 (La. 1985) (holding that LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 23:1361 (1985) permits workers to exercise right to workers' compensation without fear
of discharge); Maine: Terrio v. Millenocket Community Hosp., 379 A.2d 135 (Me. 1977) (parties
may enter into employment contracts terminable only for cause by clearly stating their intention to do
so); Maryland: Ewing v, Koppers Co., 537 A.2d 1173 (Md. 1988) (employee's discharge for filing
workers' compensation claim contravenes public policy); Massachusetts: DeRose v. Putnam
Management Co., 496 N.E.2d 428 (Mass. 1986) (employee discharged for refusing to testify against
co-worker can recover damages for wrongful discharge); Michigan: Goins v. Ford Motor Co., 347
N.W.2d 184 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (employer cannot discharge employee for having filed workers'
compensation claim against previous employer); Minnesota: Phipps v. Clark Oil & Ref. Corp., 396
N.W.2d 588 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (employee allegedly discharged for refusing to put leaded gasoline
into an "unleaded fuel only" car has stated a public policy exception to the at-will doctrine);
Mississippi: Laws v. Aetna Fin. Co., 667 F. Supp. 342 (N.D. Miss. 1987) (limited exception to the
at-will doctrine recognized for refusal to commit an illegal act); Missouri: Boyle v. Vista Eyewear,
700 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (employee discharged for refusal to violate a well-established
public policy has cause of action); Montana: MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to -914; Nebraska:
Johnston v. Panhandle Coop. Ass'n, 408 N.W.2d 261 (Neb. 1987) (employee handbook constitutes
a contract if it meets requirements for unilateral contract formation); Nevada: Hansen v. Harrah's,
675 P.2d 394 (Nev. 1984) (discharge of at-will employee for filing for workers' compensation claim
is actionable in tort); New Hampshire: Foley v. Community Oil Co., 64 F.R.D. 561 (D.N.H. 1974)
(contract for definite period may be implied from employee's length of service and relocation of
family at his employer's request); New Jersey: Fregara v. Jet Aviation Business Jets, 764 F. Supp.
940 (D.NJ. 1991) (handbook language created a binding contract limiting employer's right to
terminate absent good cause); New Mexico: Vigil v. Arzola, 699 P.2d 613 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983),
rev'd on other grounds, 687 P.2d 1083 (N.M. 1983) (policy manual may constitute an implied
contract even for probationary employees); New York: Sivel v. Readers Digest, Inc., 677 F. Supp.
183 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (oral assurances showed evidence of express limitations required to rebut the
at-will presumption); North Carolina: Coman v. Thomas Mfg. Co., 381 S.E.2d 445 (N.C. 1989)
(North Carolina recognizes the refusal to commit an illegal act exception to the at-will doctrine); North
Dakota: Krein v. Marian Manor Nursing Home, 415 N.W.2d 793 (N.D. 1987) (North Dakota
recognizes public policy exception to the at-will doctrine for a discharge resulting from filing workers'
compensation claim); Ohio: Merkel v. Scovill, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 133 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (public
policy exception to the at-will doctrine is recognized for discharge resulting from refusal to commit
peijury at employer's request); Oklahoma: Webb v. Dayton Tire & Rubber Co., 697 P.2d 519 (Okla.
1985) (Oklahoma recognizes cause of action for retaliatory discharge resulting from filing workers'
compensation claim); Oregon: Delaney v. Taco Time Int'l, 681 P.2d 114 (Or. 1984) (employee
terminated for refusal to sign false statements regarding another's termination has action in tort for
wrongful discharge); Pennsylvania: Shaw v. Russell Trucking Line, 542 F. Supp. 776 (W.D. Pa.
1982) (employee may have cause of action for wrongful discharge for dismissal resulting from
reporting a violation of the law); Rhode Island: Cummins v. E.G. & G. Sealol, 690 F. Supp. 134
(D.R.I. 1988) (at-will employees have cause of action in tort for retaliatory discharge for reporting
violations of statutorily recognized public policy); South Carolina: Ludwick v. This Minute of
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employer-employee relationship, are now active partners in its regulation.4
With the development of case law has come a renewed emphasis on
legislative proposals intended to protect employees from the adverse effects of
unjust termination.5 In 1980, the Corporate Democracy Act was introduced in
Congress.6 The bill, which would have amended the National Labor Relations
Act,7 curtailed the right of employers to discharge employees freely.A Viewed
as an unacceptable encroachment on the employer's prerogative to terminate, the
legislation could not muster sufficient support and died at the end of the legislative
term. 9
State legislative activity, no less acute, did not fare differently. Between
1973 and 1991, at least five states introduced, without success, legislation
Carolina, 337 S.E.2d 213 (S.C. 1985) (South Carolina recognizes public policy exceptions to the at-
will doctrine); South Dakota: Larson v. Kreiser's, Inc., 472 N.W.2d 761 (S.D. 1991) (employee who
is promised a promotion to a specific position in exchange for continued work is no longer an at-will
employee); Tennessee: Clanton v. Cain-Sloan Co., 677 S.W.2d 441 (Tenn. 1984) (Tennessee
Supreme Court recognizes cause of action for retaliatory discharge based on filing for workers'
compensation benefits); Texas: Murray Corp. v. Brooks, 600 S.W.2d 897 (Tex. Ct. App. 1980)
(Texas has a statutory exception to the at-will doctrine for retaliatory discharge of employee filing
workers' compensation claim); Utah: Hatton-Ward v. Salt Lake City Corp., 828 P.2d 1071 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992) (employee alleging retaliatory discharge may seek relief pursuant to state's whistleblower
statute); Vermont: Sherman v. Rutland Hosp., 500 A.2d 230 (Vt. 1985) (pre-employment conduct
of employee and employer constituted an express or implied agreement to incorporate the policy
manual's termination provision into the employment agreement); Virginia: Fielder v. Southco, Inc.,
699 F. Supp. 577 (W.D. Va. 1988) (employee allegedly discharged for reporting his supervisor's
sexual harassment of female employees has a cause of action for retaliatory discharge); Washington:
Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081 (Wash. 1984) (Washington recognizes exception
to at-will doctrine when the discharge contravenes a mandate of public policy); West Virginia:
Gillespie v. Elkins S. Baptist Church, 350 S.E.2d 715 (W. Va. 1986) (the at-will status may be
modified by a personnel manual); Wisconsin: Ferraro v. Kuelsch, 368 N.W.2d 666 (Wis. 1985) (an
employee handbook can modify at-will employment); Wyoming: Griess v. Consolidated Freightways
Corp., 776 P.2d 72 (Wyo. 1989) (an employee not covered by a collective bargaining agreement may
maintain a cause of action for wrongful discharge for filing workers' compensation claim).
4. For years, courts viewed the employment relationship in the same way as a marriage - a
private relationship subject to internal controls. Strict adherence to the traditional at-will rule often
produced harsh results. To alleviate such consequences, courts have modified the rule to afford at-will
employees some protection from unwarranted or injudicious discharge.
5. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Constitutional, Political and Attitudinal Barriers to Reforming
Wrongful Dismissal Law, in PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY FORTY-SECOND ANNUAL
NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR §§ 3.01-.06 (Bruno Stein ed., 1989). In advocating the passage
of a federal and state statute, Professor Perritt posits that shifts in the balance of power require "more
than a mere codification of common law theories." Id. § 3.01, at 3-3. Ideally, a constitutional statute
will extinguish common law theories, make full use of incentive-based arbitration, provide
administrative-type judicial review if arbitration is mandatory, and ensure that statutory replacements
for common law rights are balanced and reasonable. Id. § 3.05, at 3-35 to 3-43.
6. H.R. REP. No. 7010, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
7. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988 & Supp. 1992).
8. See 1981 CIS S241-19.6, 386.
9. The Narrowing Right to Fire: How Chemical Companies are Coping, CHEMICAL WEEK, June
22, 1983, at 46, 48.
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restricting an employer's right to terminate employees without cause.10 Montana
is the only state that has been able to surmount all obstacles created by a
formidable, albeit ironic, alliance of union and business interests."
In 1985, the Uniform Law Commissioners formed a subcommittee comprised
of prominent labor and management advocates and academicians. After six years
of intense activity, the subcommittee produced the Model Employment
Termination Act." Less intrusive than statutory law, it is a watered-down
version of the bill introduced in Congress in 1980. It is, however, the first
comprehensive rule-making initiative.
Today the rule of employment-at-will remains in flux. This situation will
likely continue as the American unionized work force shrinks, and courts and
legislatures look for ways to protect workers. Whether the politics of the time
will succeed in compelling new legislative initiatives or impose on judges, as
sculptors of public policy, the function of strengthening the common law rights
of employees, it is clear that the at-will rule, once a virtual kingpin in
employment law, has now been reduced to a patchwork of theories, exceptions,
and evidentiary presumptions.
10. HENRY H. PERRrIT, JR., EMPLOYEE DIsMIssAL LAW AND PRACTICE § 9.11, at 216-18
(1992). States which introduced such legislation included California, Connecticut, Michigan, New
York, and Pennsylvania. Id. The Michigan and Pennsylvania bills applied to all employees not
covered by collective bargaining agreements and prohibited dismissal without just cause. Id. at 216.
Both provided for a two-step grievance procedure incorporating mediation and arbitration. Id. at 217.
A committee of the California State Bar endorsed legislation establishing a just-cause standard for
dismissal, arbitration, and reinstatement with back pay as a primary remedy. Id. at 218.
11. Id. at 215. Employers and unions found themselves on the same side of the bargaining table
for very different reasons. Id. Employers were reluctant to relinquish managerial authority over
personnel. Id. Conversely, unions opposed the legislation because it would eliminate the principal
incentive for workers to join unions - job protection. Id.
12. § 1-14, 7A U.L.A. 67 (Supp. 1992). The Uniform Employment Termination Act prohibits
an employer from discharging an employee without good cause. Id. § 3(a). It extinguishes all
common law rights and claims of a terminated employee against the employer based on the termination
in exchange for statutory protection. Id. § 2(c). It does not displace statutory or collective bargaining
agreement rights or express written or oral agreements. Id. § 2(e). The Act applies to persons who
have been employed for one year and who have worked 520 hours during the 26 weeks before
termination. Id. § 3(b). Parties may waive the good cause requirement only by express written
agreement, provided a minimum schedule of severance pay is provided. Id. § 4(c). A quintessential
component of the Act is the arbitration provision. See id. §§ 5-6. Remedies include back pay, lump
sum severance, and attorney fees, although reinstatement is the preferred remedy. Id. § 7. Vacaturs
are based on the Uniform Arbitration Act. Id. § 6. Despite the consideration given by the drafting
committee to address the substantive rights of employees, random remedies, and a time-consuming
decision-making process, the Act has drawn considerable criticism. Among the opponents' concerns:
(1) elimination of common law torts and contract claims; (2) elimination of punitive damages in
egregious cases; (3) elimination of emotional distress damages; (4) drastic limits on prospective front
pay damages; (5) ability of employer to "opt out" of the Act by obtaining agreements with employees
that provide liquidated damages, establish an internal ADR procedure, and establish performance
standards; (6) exclusion of part-time public and small firm employees; (7) unreasonably short statute
of limitations; (8) limited discovery; (9) liberal appeal provision; and (10) good-cause standard subject
to harsh interpretation. See generally Paul H. Tobias, Defects in the Model Employment Termnation
Act, LABOR LAW J. 500 (Aug. 1992).
[Vol. 1993, No. I
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This Article begins by reviewing the historical evolution of the at-will rule
and examining the common law wrongful dismissal theories. Next, it describes
the recent trend of arbitrating wrongful discharge disputes, a trend which the
author suggests provides a practical, sound forum for the resolution of
employment claims.' 3 Finally, since arbitration is in derogation of the common
law, this Article discusses the constitutional and pragmatic barriers to full-scale
reform and use of arbitration. The author concludes that fragmentation of
interests, political motivations, and the reluctance of the United States Supreme
Court to confront an indispensable provision of the Federal Arbitration Act are
insufficient to overcome the strong if not virtually impregnable presumption
favoring arbitration.
II. OVERVIEW OF EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL
The concept of employment-at-will is not an American aberration. Traced
to British law, an employment contract providing for no specific duration was
presumed to be for a year. Blackstone observed that the law was intended to
protect agricultural workers. 4  As Great Britain became industrialized,
exceptions were made to the yearly presumption. 5 Custom of trade determined
the duration of employment.' 6
American courts later adopted the traditional British perspective on at-will
employment. In Payne v. Western & Atlantic Railroad,7 the earliest case to
address the rule, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that an employer may
discharge or retain an employee "at will for good cause or for no cause, or even
for bad cause without thereby being guilty of an unlawful act per se. ""1 This
13. As the once impenetrable employment-at-will rle eroded, employers who sought to stave off
organized labor implemented arbitration. By doing so, they rejected the at-will employment
arrangement. Today, arbitration has become a favored process to resolve employment disputes
primarily because arbitrators have the necessary skills, training, and experience to understand the
unique problems of the work place.
14. See CHARLES G. BAKALY, JR. & JOEL M. GROSSMAN, THE MODERN LAW OF EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONSHIPS § 1.4, at 9 (1991); STEPHEN PEPE & SCOTT DUNHAM, AVOIDING AND DEFENDING
WRONGFUL DISCHARGE CLAIMS § 1:02, at 3 (1991).
15. See Hathaway v. Bennett, 10 N.Y. 108 (1854). In this case, the New York Court of
Appeals, relying on British precedent, held that a newspaper carrier was properly terminated even
without notice. Id. at 113. The court's opinion introduced the rule of mutuality of obligation, i.e.,
that the plaintiff could terminate his employment with the defendant at any time, with or without
notice. Id. at 112. American courts, however, rejected the yearly presumption. H.G. WOOD, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT 283 (1886).
16. BAKALY & GROSSMAN, supra note 14, § 1.4, at 9.
17. 81 Tenn. 507.
18. Id. at 518. Commentators disagree on the origin of the doctrine. Some credit H.G. Wood's
treatise. See supra note 15. Wood's rule stated that a hiring for an indefinite period was
presumptively at-will and was terminable at any time by either party. See Wood, supra note 15, at
283-86. Others credit Hathaway v. Bennett, 10 N.Y. 108. In Hathaway, the court held that just as
an employee could quit at any time, an employer could terminate him at any time except if trade
custom required notice. Id. at 113. Absent this exception, the employer was free to terminate the
1993]
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right may be exercised by the employee in the same way. 19 The court's opinion
illustrated the legal effect of employment-at-will and reinforced the rule of
mutuality of obligation; unless both parties to a contract are bound, neither is
bound.
The mutuality doctrine was strengthened in Adair v. United States.20 The
United States Supreme Court found unconstitutional a congressional act which
made it a criminal offense for a carrier engaged in interstate commerce to
discharge an employee because of union membership. The Court upheld the
employer's unrestrained freedom to discharge at-will employees without cause,
finding the act to be "repugnant to the Fifth Amendment and as not embraced by
nor within the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce." 21 After
Adair, the at-will rule had a constitutional foundation, one which would remain
undisturbed for several decades.
Erosion of the ironclad rule occurred in 1935 with the passage of the
National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act).' The centerpiece of the Act,
Section 7, encouraged collective bargaining and protected a worker's exercise of
freedom of association and self-organization.23 The Wagner Act was upheld
when the Supreme Court repudiated the constitutional protection of the employer's
absolute right to discharge by declaring the Wagner Act constitutional in NLRB
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.24 The mutuality of obligation theory, though
employee at will. Id. In another early case, Perry v. Wheeler, 75 Ky. (12 Bush) 541 (1877), an
employee was dismissed although he had a contract of "permanent" employment. The Kentucky
Supreme Court held that "permanent" is not meant literally and stressed the mutuality of obligation.
Id. at 548-49. A final source, a code written by David Dudley Field in 1865 and adopted by
California in 1873, defined at-will as follows: "Termination at will. An employment having no
specified term may be terminated at the will of either party on notice to the other except where
otherwise provided by this Title." CAL. CIV. CODE § 1999 (1873).
19. Payne, 81 Tenn. at 518.
20. 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
21. Id. at 180. The Court rationalized the decision by stating that "the employer and the
employee have equality of right, and any legislation that disturbs that equality is an arbitrary
interference with the liberty of contract." Id. at 175. To deny the employer the freedom to discharge
his or her employees at-will constitutes deprivation of property without due process of law, and is a
clear violation of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 174, 176.
22. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169.
23. See id. § 151. This language states:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of
certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate
these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure
of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of
association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing,
for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other
mutual aid or protection.
Id.
24. 301 U.S. 1 (1937). In upholding the constitutionality of the Act, the Court distinguished
between the "normal" exercise of the right of discharge and the use of the right of discharge to coerce
and to intimidate employees from engaging in collective bargaining, holding that the legislative
purpose was to preclude only the latter. Id. at 45-46.
[Vol. 1993, No. I
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ostensibly confined to employees subject to collective bargaining agreements, was
no longer applicable without limitation.
The shift which occurred in Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. did not penetrate
the non-union arena until the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided Geary v.
United States Steel Corp.' Geary, a tubular product salesman, was dismissed
after expressing concern over inadequately tested products. 26 Although the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court was presented with an ideal opportunity to decide
whether an employer's unfettered right to discharge employees should be
judicially restricted, it declined to do so; instead, the court focused on the narrow
issue of whether the employer's conduct constituted specific intent to harm or
accomplish an ulterior purpose.' Geary, the court concluded, "had made a
nuisance of himself, and the company discharged him to preserve administrative
order in its own house. "28
The public policy argument advanced by Geary was, with equal force,
rejected.29  Geary did not have expertise to assess safety, nor did his
responsibilities include making judgments concerning products which enter the
stream of commerce." The court held that public policy must be clear, not
amorphous, for a claim to prevail.31
A compelling dissent by Justice Roberts produced the seed for what would
later become a public policy exception. Characterizing the majority opinion as
one which "fails to perceive that the prevention of injury is a fundamental and
highly desirable objective of our society,"32 Justice Roberts addressed the
"realities of twentieth century industrial organization . . . recognizing [that] a
cause of action for wrongful discharge ... will help to check a serious menace
25. 319 A.2d 174 (Pa. 1974).
26. Id. at 175.
27. Id. at 177-78.
28. Id. at 178.
29. Id. at 179. The court stated:
The praiseworthiness of Geary's motives does not detract from the company's legitimate
interest in preserving its normal operational procedures from disruption. In sum, while
we agree that employees should be encouraged to express their educated views on the
quality of their employer's products, we are not persuaded that creating a new non-
statutory cause of action of the sort proposed by appellant is to the best way to achieve
this result. On balance, whatever public policy imperatives can be discerned here seem
to militate against such a course.
Id. at 180 (footnotes omitted).
30. Id. 178-79.
31. Id. at 180 n.16. In rejecting the broad public policy arguments interposed by Geary, the
court was adamant that the notion of substantive due process does not reactivate the employer's
constitutional right to discharge freely. See id. at 180. The court stated: "But this case does not
require us to define in comprehensive fashion the perimeters of this privilege [elevating the employer's
privilege of hiring and firing to an absolute constitutional right], and we decline to do so." Id. The
court added: "Where the complaint ... discloses a plausible and legitimate reason for terminating
an at-will employment relationship and no clear mandate of public policy is violated," an employee
has no cause of action. Id.
32. Id. at 181 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
19931
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in our society, the arbitrary dismissal power of employers."3 3 Lamenting the
employee's "highly vulnerable status," he observed:
Courts are duty-bound to fashion remedies for the changing
circumstances of economic and social reality. And it is far too late in
the day for this Court to indulge itself by fictionalizing that the doctrine
of freedom of contract justified insulation of an employer's arbitrary
and abusive exercise of his power of discharge.'
Geary represented a turning point for at-will cases. No longer were courts
willing to rubber-stamp the doctrine. The majority opinion, despite holding for
the employer on the facts, made clear that an employer-employee relationship was
a proper subject of inquiry for the courts. With Geary, a slight though
unpronounced shift toward employee rights had occurred.
III. EXCEPTIONS To THE AT-WILL RULE
It did not take long for courts to traverse the path created by Geary. Today
the at-will rule, while alive in theory,35 is riddled with exceptions which allow
courts to inquire into and to regulate the once sacrosanct relationship between the
employer and employee.
A. Implied Contract
The implied contract exception is one of several theories on which courts
rely to protect employees from unjust dismissals. Derived principally from
employee handbooks, personnel manuals, and oral representations made by
employer to employee, the exception originated in a Michigan case, Toussaint v.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield.' Toussaint consisted of two consolidated cases
involving wrongful discharge.37 Each plaintiff had inquired about job security
when hired, and each was orally assured that as long as he was "doing the job"
he would not be discharged.3" Toussaint was given a policy manual which
confirmed the company's policy to discharge employees "for just cause only. 39
33. Id. at 182.
34. Id. at 185.
35. See, e.g., Shankle v. DRG Fin. Corp., 729 F. Supp. 122 (D.D.C. 1989). Employment was
considered "at-will" when plaintiff conceded he had no written contract or oral assurances of
employment for a specific duration. Id. at 125. See also Addison v. Amalgamated Clothing & Textile
Workers Union of America, 372 S.E.2d 403 (Va. 1988). where the Supreme Court of Virginia held
that since the contract did not specify a period of employment, it was presumed to be at-will. id. at
405.
36. 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980).
37. The companion case decided with Toussaint was Ebling v. Masco Corp.
38. Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 884.
39. Id.
[Vol. 1993, No. I
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In a decision which reversed years of laissez-faire attitudes toward the at-will
relationship, the Michigan Supreme Court held that a promise not to fire an
employee without cause is as enforceable as an employer's promise to pay a
bonus, pension, or other form of compensation.' Such a promise may become
part of the contract either by express agreement, oral or written, or as a result of
an employee's legitimate expectations based on policy statements in a personnel
manual. 4' The court's preoccupation with striking a balance between employer
and employee rights was evident:
While an employer need not establish personnel policies or practices,
where an employer chooses to establish such policies and practices and
makes them known to its employees, the employment relationship is
presumably enhanced. The employer secures an orderly, cooperative
and loyal work force, and the employee the peace of mind associated
with job security and the conviction that he will be treated fairly.42
The court suggested that this benefit to the employer constituted a sufficient
consideration for the employer's promise not to discharge without just cause. 3
Toussaint unleashed a spate of cases, some consistent with and others slightly
at variance with its theme. In Renny v. Port Huron Hospital," the Michigan
Supreme Court, following Toussaint, held that an employee handbook is, in
essence, tantamount to a contract and representations can create a just-cause
requirement for termination.45 The existence of a written policy, however, does
not preclude an employer from making unilateral changes to it. In 1989, the
Michigan Supreme Court, in Bankey v. Storer Broadcasting Co.,' held that an
employer may unilaterally change its written policy from one of discharge for
cause to termination at-will, provided reasonable notice is given and the change
is made in good faith.47
40. Id. at 894.
41. Id. at 885. In this case, Blue Cross did not offer any evidence to counteract the employee's
assertion that the contents of the policy manual expressed the official corporate policy on discipline
and termination. Id. at 892. Blue Cross had established a policy to discharge for cause only, and
this, combined with the written statements provided to the work force, was sufficient to overcome the
presumptive construction that the contract of employment was at-will. Id.
42. Id.
43. See id. at 894-95.
44. 398 N.W.2d 327 (Mich. 1986).
45. Id. at 335. One crucial aspect of Renny was the court's support for the policies behind
alternative dispute resolution, see id. at 336-38, a precursor of case law development five years hence.
This aspect is more fully discussed in Part IV of this Article.
46. 443 N.W.2d 112 (Mich. 1989).
47. Id. at 113. The consideration for a new unilateral contract is the employee's continued
employment. Id. at 115.
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The reach of Bankey was extended to oral promises in Bullock v. Automobile
Club of Michigan." In this case, the Michigan Supreme Court found that an
express oral promise existed at the time of employment, and changes in the
employment manual created an offer to revise the discharge-for-cause provision
of plaintiff's express contract. 9
B. Tort Actions Based on Implied Contract
Some courts, implying a duty of good faith and fair dealing in the context
of employee evaluations, allow employees to sue their employers in tort for
breach of this duty. In Chamberlain v. Bissel, Inc. ,5 the District Court for the
Western District of Michigan held that negligent performance of a contractual
obligation, resulting in harm to the other contracting party or to a third party, is
actionable in tort.5 Since the employer had a contractual obligation, per its
policy of termination for cause, to conduct employee reviews, and since it
undertook to conduct the reviews, the employer had a duty to use ordinary or
reasonable care in performing this obligation.52
However, other courts, rejecting the Chamberlain court's logic, have held
that tort actions arise only where there is a breach of duty distinct from a breach
of contract. This approach, adopted by the Michigan Court of Appeals in
Mitchell v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. , denied recovery to an employee
48. 444 N.W.2d 114 (Mich. 1989); see also Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc. v. Campbell, 512 So. 2d
725, 734-35 (Ala. 1987) (enforcing handbook provisions while they are in effect are not burdensome
to employers); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 627 (Minn. 1983) (oral
employment contract for indefinite duration modified by employee handbook); Enyeart v. Shelter Mut.
Ins. Co., 693 S.W.2d 120, 123 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (employer is contractually bound to observe
established handbook policies until they are modified or withdrawn); Woolley v. Hoffman-LaRoche,
Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1264 (N.J. 1985) (contractual obligations arising from handbooks are revocable
for legitimate business reasons); Langdon v. Saga Corp., 569 P.2d 524, 528 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976)
(personnel manual's provision can supplant prior contractual terms and become a new contract during
the period the policy is in effect and the employee performs).
49. Bullock, 444 N.W.2d at 119. Recently, this same court decided Rowe v. Montgomery Ward
& Co., 473 N.W.2d 268 (Mich. 1991). Reiterating the general rule that all employment is presumed
to be at-will absent a contrary provision, the court held that where the employee alleges a cause-only
contract based on oral statements, those statements must be "clear and unequivocal." Id. at 275; see
also Terrio, 379 A.2d at 138 (oral statement that employee was secure in her job for the rest of her
life, made in connection with her long service, creates evidentiary support for her contract claim);
American Bank Stationery v. Farmer, 799 P.2d 1100, 1102 (Nev. 1990) (employee's acceptance of
employer's explicit oral promise to keep employee on the job 's long as he performed adequately
creates an express oral contract permitting firing for cause only).
50. 547 F. Supp. 1067 (W.D. Mich. 1982).
51. Id. at 1081.
52. Id.
53. 439 N.W.2d 261 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989).
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whose tort claim emanated solely form the "contractual" relationship between
employer and employee.'
Courts receptive to a claim of tortious conduct are loath to impose
restrictions. In Rulon-Miller v. International Business Machines Corp.,s the
California Court of Appeals ruled that extreme and outrageous behavior of an
employer is actionable in tort and supports an award of punitive damages for
emotional distress .56
C. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
It is axiomatic that parties to a contract or commercial transaction are bound
by the standard of good faith.57 This good faith principle constitutes the third
54. Id. at 266. Plaintiff in Mitchell relied on Schipani v. Ford Motor Co., 302 N.W.2d 307
(Mich. Ct. App. 1981), in which an appellate panel held that an employee who states a proper claim
in contract for breach may also state a claim in tort for negligent evaluation of employment duties.
Id. at 315. Most panels of the Michigan courts, including those constituted post-Schipani, have
refused to sanction tort claims where breach of duty is indistinguishable from breach of contract. See,
e.g., Squire v. General Motors Corp., 436 N.W.2d 739 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989); Grant v. Michigan
Osteopathic Medical Ctr. Inc., 432 N.W.2d 313 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988); Lopus v. L & L Shop Rite,
Inc., 430 N.W.2d 757 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988); Loftis v. G.T. Prods., 423 N.W.2d 358 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1988). See also Ferrett v. General Motors Corp., 475 N.W.2d 243 (Mich. 1991), where an
employee, discharged for excessive absenteeism, brought an action alleging breach of contract and
negligent evaluation. Id. at 245. In declining to recognize an action in tort for negligent evaluation,
the court held that an action may be maintained, if at all, only for breach of a contractual obligation
to evaluate. Id. at 246.
55. 208 Cal. Rptr. 524 (Ct. App. 1984).
56. Id. at 534. The conduct complained of must be so extreme "as to go beyond all possible
bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community."
Id. at 533. The conduct in Rulon involved the plaintiff's manager's initial acquiescence in plaintiff's
dating arrangement with a supervisor of IBM, his subsequent flagrant disregard of IBM's policy
prohibiting him from inquiring into plaintiffs "off job behavior," his illusory choice to plaintiff [if
she gave up her lover, she could retain her job], and his final act of "making the decision for her."
Id. at 527-28; see Alcom v. Anbro Eng'g Inc., 468 P.2d 216, 219 n.5 (Cal. 1970) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (3d. ed. 1964)); see also Rogers v. Loews L'enfant
Plaza Hotel, 526 F. Supp. 523, 529-31 (D.D.C. 1981) (sexual harassment); Agarwal v. Johnson, 603
P.2d 58, 62-65 (Cal. 1979) (employee subjected to social epithets and profane insults); Kelly v.
General Tel. Co., 186 Cal. Rptr. 184 (Ct. App. 1982) (false accusation of serious crime and alteration
of personal records); McGee v. McNally, 174 Cal. Rptr. 253 (Ct. App. 1981) (campaign of
harassment designed to deprive plaintiff of his job and to replace him with a fellow worker); Lagies
v. Copley, 168 Cal. Rptr. 368 (Ct. App. 1980) (attempt to undermine professional credibility as well
as professional harassment); Renteria v. County of Orange, 147 Cal. Rptr. 447 (Ct. App. 1978) (rude
and degrading treatment including surveillance and interrogation); Toney v. State of California, 126
Cal. Rptr. 869 (Ct. App. 1976) (insidious racial harassment); Hall v. May Dep't Stores Co., 637 P.2d
126 (Or. 1978) (threat of arrest with no evidence to support charge).
57. See U.C.C. § 1-203 (1990); see also, e.g., MASS. GEN. L. ch. 93B, § 4(3)(c)-(d) (1984);
Kerrigan v. Boston, 278 N.E.2d 387, 393 (Mass. 1972) (collective bargaining contract); Murach v.
Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 158 N.E.2d 338, 342 (Mass. 1959) (in an insurance contract,
insurer must exercise discretionary power to settle claims in good faith); Krauss v. Keuchler, 15
N.E.2d 207, 208 (Mass. 1938); Clark v. State St. Trust Co., 169 N.E. 897, 903 (Mass. 1930)
(secondary agreement to a stock option agreement); Elliott v. Kazajian, 152 N.E. 351, 352 (Mass.
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type of at-will exception. Only a handful of states, however, have recognized the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in employment contracts."8
The seminal case is Cleary v. American Airlines.59 Plaintiff was discharged
for violating employer-imposed regulations,' and plaintiff sued, invoking an
implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing.61  Tracing the
development of good faith and fair dealing from insurance contracts to all
contracts, the duty which arises from this principle, said the court, is
unconditional, independent in nature, and not controlled by events in the same
manner as conditions subsequent or precedent.' The longevity of an employee's
service, together with the expressed policy of the employer, operates as a form
of estoppel and precludes discharge without good cause.
63
At the time, Cleary represented a quantum leap in the protection of employee
rights, a bold attempt by a liberal court to regulate, in the absence of specific
statutory guidelines, the relationship between employer and employee. Some
viewed the result in Cleary as contrived, calibrated to diminish rampant unionism
by safeguarding employment and thwarting the primary benefit of collectively
bargained job protection.
Regardless of the court's motivation, Cleary paved the way for other
jurisdictions to fall in line. Montana took the lead in Gates v. Life of Montana
Insurance Co.' In adopting the doctrine of good faith and fair dealing in
1926) (broker's commission).
58. Alabama: Campbell, 512 So. 2d at 738 (a duty of good faith and fair dealing is implied in
all contracts under state law, including employment contracts); Alaska: Mitford v. de Lasala, 666
P.2d 1000, 1007 (Alaska 1983) (covenant of good faith and fair dealing prevents the discharge of an
employee for the purpose of denying him from sharing corporation's- future profits); Arizona:
Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1040 (Ariz. 1985) (covenant of good faith
and fair dealing protects an employee from discharge because of an employer's desire to withhold
benefits earned); California: Cleary v. American Airlines, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 729 (Ct. App. 1980);
see infra notes 59-63 and accompanying text; Connecticut: Magnan v. Anaconda Indus., 479 A.2d
781, 789 (Conn. 1984) (implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is recognized in the at-will
context when necessary to fulfill the parties' reasonable expectations); Idaho: Metcalf v.
Intermountain Gas Co., 778 P.2d 744, 749 (Idaho 1989) (implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing is recognized to protect the parties' benefit in the employment contract); Massachusetts:
Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1256 (Mass. 1977) (at-will employment
carries implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in a contract barring discharge to avoid paying
accrued benefits); Montana: Gates v. Life of Montana Ins. Co, 638 P.2d 1063, 1066-67 (Mont.
1982); see infra notes 64-66 and accompanying text; Nevada: K-Mart Corp. v. Pansock, 732 P.2d
1364, 1370 (Nev. 1987) (the bad faith discharge is recognized as a violation of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing); New Hampshire: Cloutier v. Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co., 436 A.2d
1140, 1143 (N.H. 1981) (implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is recognized in all
contractual relationships); see also Kimberly Kraly Geariety, At-will Employment: The for Good
Faith and Fair Dealing Between Employers and Employees, 28 WiLLAMErTE L. REV. 681 (1992).
59. 168 Cal. Rptr. 722.
60. Id. at 724.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 728.
63. Id. at 729.
64. 638 P.2d 1063.
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employment contracts, the Montana Supreme Court followed the balancing test
established by prior courts and recognized that "'an employer is entitled to be
motivated by and to serve its own legitimate business interests; that an employer
must have wide latitude in deciding whom it will employ in the face of the
uncertainties of the business world .... '"' Yet, the court continued, "the
employee is entitled to some protection. "'
While this covenant has gained healthy recognition in several jurisdictions,
its use is not without limit. California, retreating drastically from Cleary,
imposed a stringent limit on damages for breach of the covenant in Foley v.
Interactive Data Corp.7 The Foley court, in confining recovery to contract
damages only, rejected the notion of a special employment relationship analogous
to insured and insurer.68 With respect to tort remedies generally, the court, in
dictum, commented: "The covenant of good faith is read into contracts in order
to protect the express covenants or promises of the contract, not to protect some
general public policy interest not directly tied to the contract's purposes."69
Creation or extension of rights beyond those provided by contract law, observed
the court, lies within the province of the legislature.70
Most states have relaxed their application of the covenant, preferring to
predicate recovery on the slightly less nebulous implied-in-fact contract and public
policy tort exceptions. However, Montana remains aggressive. In 1987,
Montana enacted the Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act7' and became
65. Id. at 1066-67 (quoting Fortune, 364 N.E.2d at 1256).
66. Id. at 1067. The case was remanded to determine whether the employer, in failing to follow
established procedures regarding terminations, breached the covenant. Id. In a second review, the
Montana Supreme Court addressed two fundamental issues. See Gates v. Life of Montana Ins. Co.,
668 P.2d 213 (Mont. 1983). First, whether punitive damages can be recovered for breach of the duty
to deal fairly and in good faith? Second, whether the breach was for the jury to decide? Id. at 216.
Relying on Lipinski v. Title Insurance Co., 655 P.2d 970 (Mont. 1982), the court held that, even in
the absence of statutory violations, punitive damages may be assessed when the duty with respect to
an employee is breached. Gates, 668 P.2d at 714. While this duty may arise out of the employment
relationship, the duty exists apart from, and in addition to, terms agreed to by the parties. Id. Since
the duty is imposed by operation of law, tort remedies are available. Id. at 715. Observing that
'courts exercise the greatest self-restraint in interfering with the constitutionally mandated processes
of jury decisions," the court located evidence in the record to support the jury's finding of fraud,
oppression, and malice and reinstated the jury's award of punitive damages. Id. at 215-16. "The
sting of punitive damages will only be sanctioned where" there is conduct which rises to the requisite
level of culpability. Id. at 216.
67. 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988).
68. Id. at 396.
69. Id. at 394.
70. Id. at 397 & n.31. See also Majerus v. Skaggs Alpha Beta, 799 P.2d 1053 (Mont. 1990),
where the Montana Supreme Court held that even when the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
applies to an employment relationship, the employer may still terminate an employee if there is a "fair
and honest reason" for the termination. Id. at 1055. In this case, the theft of company funds
constituted "more than a simple transgression" which justified the employee's discharge. Id. at 1056.
71. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to -914.
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one of the first states to legislate the victories achieved through judicial
activism.'
Today, most states do not recognize the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing exception to the at-will rule. The rationale for refusing to align with
the pro-covenant states was well-articulated by the Washington Supreme Court in
Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co. ,3 significantly, to imply a duty to terminate
in good faith into every employment contract would "subject each discharge to
judicial incursions into the amorphous concept of bad faith. "' Such intrusions
are better left to the legislature.75
D. Public Policy
Of all legal theories, the public policy argument is the most frequently
asserted and represents a fertile source for expanding employee rights. The
majority of cases fall into three distinct categories:
(1) discharge for whistle-blowing;
(2) discharge in retaliation for exercising a vested or statutory right, e.g.,
suing the employer for a workers' compensation claim; and
(3) discharge in retaliation for refusing to commit an illegal act.76
1. Discharge for Whistle-Blowing
Some states have passed statutes which protect employees from being
discharged for exposing the legal violation of others.' Under these statutes,
72. The Montana statute authorizes damages for discharges which: (a) violate public policy or
arise from reporting a violation of public policy; (b) lack cause; or (c) violate the employer's express
personnel policy provisions. Id. § 39-2-904. Federal whistleblower claims and claims which would
otherwise arise under collective bargaining agreements are excluded. Id. § 39-2-912. Actions must
be filed within one year of the discharge. Id. § 39-2-911. The statute provides for wages and lost
benefits for a period not to exceed four years. Id. § 39-2-905. Punitive damages can be awarded if
actual fraud or malice is shown. Id. If the employer maintains written internal procedures, those
procedures must be exhausted before filing an action. Id. § 39-2-911. Arbitration is governed by the
Uniform Arbitration Act. Id. § 39-2-914. A party whose valid offer to arbitrate is not accepted and
who prevails in court is entitled to reasonable attorney fees incurred after the offer to arbitrate. Id.
If an employee makes a valid offer to arbitrate and prevails, the employer pays costs and fees of
arbitration. Id. If a valid offer to arbitrate is accepted, arbitration is the exclusive remedy for the
wrongful discharge. Id.
73. 685 P.2d 1081.
74. Id. at 1086 (quoting Parnar, 652 P.2d at 629).
75. Id. at 1086-87.
76. BAKALY & GROSSMAN, supra note 14, § 11.1, at 200.
77. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-532(A)-(E) (1985); CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.5 (West
1989); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-50.5-101 to -107 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-51m (1958); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 5115 (1974); IOWA CODE § 19A.19 (1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-2973
(1989); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:964 (West 1985); MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 15.361-.369
(West 1983); N.J. REV. STAT. § 34.19-1-8 (1988); N.Y. LAB. LAW. § 740 (2)(a) (McKinney 1984);
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generally, to prevail, an employee must show that she engaged in protected
activity defined by the applicable whistleblowers' act, she was subsequently
discharged, and there was a causal connection between the protected activity and
the subsequent discharge. The burden then shifts to the employer to assert
legitimate reasons for the discharge, i.e., the employer must rebut the prima facie
case established by the protected employee.
Michigan, one of the first states to pass a whistleblowers' statute, addressed
the public policy exception in 7yrna v. Adamo, Inc.' s Plaintiff, claiming
retaliatory discharge for reporting a faulty furnace to the Health Department, filed
a claim against Adamo, Inc. under the Michigan Occupational Safety and Health
Act ("MIOSHA"). 79 Plaintiff also filed a separate suit against Adamo, Inc. in
circuit court, alleging that she was fired in violation of the Whistleblowers'
Protection Act.' When the trial judge granted summary disposition in favor of
defendants, finding plaintiffs exclusive remedy to be confined to an
administrative action for wrongful discharge under MIOSHA, plaintiff
appealed.81
The Michigan Court of Appeals distinguished between administrative and
legal remedies, and held that plaintiff could properly maintain an action under the
Whistleblowers' Protection Act even if the employer's wrongful conduct also
violates the Michigan Occupational Safety and Health Act.' This is wholly
consistent with the underlying purpose of the Whistleblowers' Protection Act
which "seeks to protect the integrity of the law by removing barriers to employee
efforts to report violations of the law."83
Recognition of the whistleblowers' exception is not limited to reporting
violations of law to regulatory organizations or law enforcement officials. In
Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods," the quality control director reported
deviations in the company's food labeling to his supervisor.' Soon after his
report, he was discharged.' The Supreme Court of Connecticut adopted the
employee's theory of wrongful discharge.' If the employee had not reported
the violation, he could have been subject to criminal sanctions.' According to
OKLA. STAT. tit. 74, § 841.7-.8 (1981 & Supp. 1984); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1421-1428 (1963);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-7(5) (1986). These statutes often provide a full range of legal and injunctive
remedies including reinstatement, payment of back wages, full reinstatement of benefits and seniority
rights, actual damages, costs, and attorney fees.
78. 407 N.W.2d 47 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987).
79. Id. at 48; see MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 408.1001-.1094 (West 1985 & Supp. 1992).
80. 7yma, 407 N.W.2d at 48; see MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 15.362-.369.
81. 7yrna, 407 N.W.2d at 49.
82. Id. at 51.
83. Id. (quoting Hopkins v. City of Midland, 404 N.W.2d 744, 749 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987)).
84. 427 A.2d 385 (Conn. 1980).
85. Id. at 386.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 389.
88. Id. at 388.
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the court, an employee should not be put in a position to choose between possible
criminal sanctions and loss of his employment.'
Federal courts have recognized this exception when applicable state law
makes retaliatory discharge a crime. In Beline v. K-Mart Corp. ," an employee
brought suit claiming he was fired in retaliation for reporting to management his
supervisor's possible criminal activity involving store merchandise.9' The
employee pursued the matter internally and did not report the matter to police.'
The trial court granted the employer's summary judgment motion.93
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that although no law compels an
individual to report criminal activity, public policy favors the exposure of
crime. 91 Illinois law shields employees from retaliatory discharge for
volunteering information on suspected criminal activity to encourage crime
reporting.' The risk of discharge may deter employees from making such
reports. 96
2. Exercising a Vested or Statutory Right
It is well-settled that the at-will rule cannot be asserted to defeat explicit
rights which have been established by the legislature, e.g., Title VII rights.'
In Ambroz v. Cornhusker Square,98 an employee was discharged when he
refused to take a polygraph exam under the Nebraska Truth and Deception
Examiners Act. 99 The Act prevents employers from requiring a polygraph as
a condition of employment unless the employment involves public law
enforcement. 11 Plaintiff's position as a security guard did not meet the
threshold requirement.' 10 The Supreme Court of Nebraska concluded that the
89. Id. at 389.
90. 940 F.2d 184 (7th Cir. 1991).
91. Id. at 185.
92. Id. at 186.
93. Id. at 185.
94. Id. at 187.
95. See id. at 188-89.
96. Id. at 188.
97. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. L. ch. 268, § 14A (1990); MICH. CO?4'. LAWS ANN. § 37.1202
(West 1985) (statute prohibits discharge of handicapped employee who is otherwise qualified for the
job); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2313.18(A)(B) (Anderson 1991) (prohibits retaliatory discharge for
serving on jury duty); see also PAUL H. TOBIAS, LmGATING WRONGFUL DISCHARGE CLAIMS § 2:53,
at 207-08 (1990).
98. 416 N.W.2d 510, 512 (Neb. 1987).
99. Id.; see NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-1901 (1981).
100. Ambroz, 416 N.W.2d at 512.
101. Id.
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statute is a clear mandate of public policy on wrongful discharge." A
discharge which flies in the face of clear public policy cannot be sustained.l°3
3. Refusing to Commit an Illegal Act
Under this exception, the court's mandate is to assess whether a discharge
is based on fulfilling a legal duty and whether there is sufficient nexus to an
expressed public policy of the state. This is not an enviable task, given the body
of law which purports to define the scope of public policy, but often falls short
of doing so.
In Trombetta v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton Railroad Co. ,14 a discharged
employee contended that he was requested to alter pollution control reports."m
The reports were required by state law to ensure conformity with state pollution
control standards." The employee argued that his discharge, allegedly for
failure to alter the reports, violated public policy."° The Michigan Court of
Appeals held that at-will exceptions are recognized to prevent the contravention
of public policy."'s The public policy of Michigan, the court stated, does not
condone attempts to violate its laws.t9
For a terminated employee to prevail under this exception, it is enough for
the employee reasonably to believe that action ordered by the employer was
102. Id. at 515.
103. Id. at 514. This exception also has been applied to an employee who is terminated because
of a legal claim asserted against an employer. In Smith v. Atlas Off-Shore Boat Service, 653 F.2d
1057 (5th Cir. 1981), an employee seaman suffered an injury on a ship, and his attorney notified the
employer that he was filing a personal injury claim under the Jones Act. Id. at 1059. The ship
captain advised the seaman to drop the suit or face dismissal. Id. The employee refused and was
fired. Id. The employer argued that there was no cause of action for retaliatory discharge under
maritime law. Id. The court disagreed, holding that discharge in retaliation for exercising a legal
right under the Jones Act constitutes a maritime tort. Id. at 1063. An employer should not be
permitted to use his right to discharge to retaliate against an employee for seeking to recover what is
due him or to intimidate an employee from seeking legal remedies. Id. at 1062. 'The right to
discharge at-will should not be allowed to bar the courthouse door." Id.
In Dudewicz v. Norris Schmid, Inc., 480 N.W.2d 612 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991), plaintiff brought
suit alleging that his dismissal, stemming from criminal charges filed against his supervisor for assault
at work, violated public policy. Defendant sought partial summary judgment. Id. at 613. The trial
court granted defendant's motion for partial summary judgment and then dismissed plaintiff's motion
for reconsideration. Id. The court granted defendant a directed verdict, concluding that the public
policy argument and the Whistleblowers' Protection Act were inapplicable. Id. The Michigan Court
of Appeals reversed and held that to allow the discharge of an at-will employee for filing a criminal
complaint against a co-worker would force the employee to choose between justice and livelihood.
Id. at 614. "It is the public policy of this state to protect its citizens from such an onerous choice."
Id.
104. 265 N.W.2d 385 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978).
105. Id. at 386.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 388.
109. Id.
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illegal, contrary to clearly expressed statutory policy. In Martin Marietta Corp.
v. Lorenz,"0 a former at-will employee brought a wrongful discharge action
alleging that he had been discharged because he refused to deceive and to
misrepresent the quality of materials used by Martin Marietta in designing
equipment for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)."'
The trial court directed a verdict in favor of the employer and ruled that in
Colorado a public policy exception was not cognizable. " The court of appeals,
utilizing the standard established in Cronk v. Intermountain Rural Electric
Ass'n, "3 reversed."' Martin Marietta appealed to the Colorado Supreme
Court, urging the court that, should it endorse the exception, it should restrict its
application to situations where there existed "a specific statutory prohibition
evincing a clear public-policy."' 15
Relying on Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local
396"6 where this doctrine was first articulated, the court acknowledged that
public policy is not a term of "precise definition. "117 The term conveys "'that
principle of law which holds that no citizen can lawfully do that which has a
tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public good.'"'1
Although courts generally have become receptive to some exceptions to the
at-will doctrine, uniformity in application continues to be lacking. From this
110. 823 P.2d 100 (Colo. 1992).
111. Id. at 102.
112. Id. at 104.
113. 765 P.2d 619 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988).
114. See Lorenz v. Martin Marietta Corp., 802 P.2d 1146, 1149 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990).
115. Martin Marrietta, 823 P.2d at 104.
116. 344 P.2d 25.
117. Martin Marietta, 823 P.2d at 105.
118. Id. (quoting Petermann, 344 P.2d at 27). This public policy exception applies even when
statutory remedies are available. In two recent cases, statutory remedies were found to be non-
exclusive. In Tate v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 833 P.2d 1218 (Okla. 1992), a black employee sued his
former employer under Tite VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C §§ 1971 to 2000h-6 (1988),
claiming retaliation for filing a discrimination charge. Tate, 833 P.2d at 1211. He also initiated a
pendent state law tort claim for wrongful discharge. Id. at 1221. Following an earlier line of cases,
the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the termination of an at-will employee which contravenes a
clear mandate of public policy "is a tortious breach of contractual obligations, compensable in
damages." Id. at 1225. The court stated that a racially-motivated discharge or one in retaliation for
filing a race discrimination complaint offends public policy and falls within the reach of Burk v. K-
Mart Corp., 770 P.2d 24 (Okla. 1989), the court's 1989 decision which adopted the public policy tort
exception to any discharge violative of constitutional, statutory, or decisional law mandates. See Tate,
833 P.2d at 1225. Notwithstanding the availability of Tide VII, Oklahoma's anti-discrimination
statute, said the court, is to be liberally construed, and remedies provided by state statute are not
exclusive. Id. at 1230. The application of Burk's common law tort to a racially motivated retaliatory
discharge was sustained. Id. In Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1992), the Utah
Supreme Court held that an employee terminated for refusal to falsify tax documents in violation of
Utah and Missouri law deserves the protection of the public policy exception of Utah's employment-at-
will doctrine. Id. at 1283. The court held "that the public policy exception applies in this state when
the statutory language expressing the public conscience is clear and when the affected interests of
society are substantial." Id. at 1282.
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quixotic tapestry of case law and pro-employee -statutes has emerged an embrace
of arbitration to counter the inevitable - a rise in employment disputes.
However logical this phenomenon, the embrace was not to be without legitimate
challenge.
IV. ARBITRATION AND WRONGFUL DISCHARGE CLAIMS
A. Transformation
Arbitration, a binding adjudicatory process, has roots in antiquity." 9 It
was exported to the American colonies, but initial acceptability remained elusive,
emanating from the English perspective that arbitration agreements were "ugly
step-children."' 2 English courts refused to enforce private agreements, and
American jurists adopted this posture without examination or analysis.'
Rapid economic growth, which mobilized the American business lobby,
ultimately reduced the hostility and protectionism displayed by courts in the early
years. In 1920, the State of New York enacted the first modem arbitration
statute. This was followed by the passage of the Federal Arbitration Act. t"
In recent years, the United States Supreme Court has interpreted the Federal
Arbitration Act as a mandate to enforce agreements to arbitrate contractual and
statutory claims. 24 Together, these cases have reduced the last vestiges of
119. BARRY B. BRAMBLE ET AL., ARBITRATION OF CONSTRUCTION DISPUTES § 1. 1, at 3 (1990);
MARTIN DOMKE, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 2:02, at 9 (Gabriel M. Wilner ed., rev.
ed. 1987); Thomas Oehmke, Commercial Arbitration § 12:3, at 17 (1987).
120. DOMKE, supra note 119, § 2:04, at 17.
121. Id.
122. See 1920 N.Y. Laws ch. 275, §§ 1-10 (codified as amended at N.Y Civ. PRAC. L. & R.
7501-7514 (McKinney 1980). Features of modem or statutory systems of arbitration: (a) treat as
irrevocable any agreement to submit future disputes to arbitration; (b) permit a party to compel a
recalcitrant party into arbitration; (c) provide that any court action instituted in violation of an
agreement may be stayed until arbitration in the agreed manner has taken place; (d) restrict the court's
freedom to revise arbitral findings of fact and applications of law; and (e) specify grounds on which
awards may be attacked for procedural defects. DOMKE, supra note 119, § 4:01, at 27. All states
except West Virginia and Alabama have modern arbitration statutes. See ROBERT COULSON, BUSINESS
ARBIrRATION - WHAT You NEED TO KNOW 175 (1987).
123. Ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1988) [hereinafter
FAA]). The drafters sought to make arbitration more acceptable in the United States by placing
arbitration agreements on the same footing as other commercial contracts. See id. § 2.
124. The Supreme Court began reversing years of judicial hostility to the arbitration of statutory
rights in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985). The
Mitsubishi Court held that broad arbitration agreements encompass all disputes including those raised
on statutory grounds. Id. at 625. The international aspect of the contract rendered claims under the
Sherman Act arbitrable. See id. at 635-36. Mitsubishi was followed by Shearson/American Express,
Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987), where the Court held that arbitration agreements of future
disputes arising under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 were enforceable. Id. at 238.
Included in the Court's broad ruling were RICO claims. See id. at 242. Finally in Rodriguez de
Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989), the Supreme Court held that pre-
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judicial hostility toward arbitration and created a more hospitable environment for
arbitration to acquire a firm hold.
To what extent does the Court's relinquishment of jurisdiction over statutory
claims apply to wrongful discharge and, more specifically, employment
discrimination? Prior to the Mitsubishi trilogy," the law was clear. In 1974,
the United States Supreme Court decided the seminal case of Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co. 26 In Alexander, the Court held that arbitration of a Title
VII claim is not to be given preclusive effect."7 The Court found "no
suggestion in the statutory scheme that a prior arbitral decision either forecloses
an individual's right to sue or divests federal courts of jurisdiction." 2s  Title
VII's purpose and procedure strongly suggest that an individual does not forfeit
his private cause of action if he first pursues his grievance in arbitration under a
non-discrimination clause of a collective bargaining agreement. 29  While an
employee presumably may waive his rights under Title VII through a voluntary
settlement, resort to arbitration to enforce contractual rights does not constitute
waiver. 31 Title VII creates statutory rights which can be protected best by
access to a judicial forum.13'
dispute agreements to arbitrate claims under the Securities Act of 1933 were enforceable. Id. at 483.
In so holding, the Court expressly overruled Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), stating that it was
inconsistent with the construction of other federal statutes governing arbitration agreements in a
business setting. Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 484-85. With this last ruling, judicial skepticism
toward arbitration all but disappeared. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1984);
Jeffrey W. Stempel, Piffalls of Public Policy: The Public Policy Exception to Arbitrability, 22 ST.
MARY's L.J. 261, 271-74 (1991).
125. See supra note 124.
126. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
127. Id. at 51.
128. Id. at 47.
129. Id. at 49.
130. Id. at 52.
131. See id. at 56-57. This view is not antithetical to American labor law. Neither does it
reduce the efficacy of arbitration. In its now famous footnote 21, the Alexander Court recognized that
arbitration, by its very structure, is due considerable deference in appropriate cases. See id. at 60
n.21. This footnote reads as follows:
We adopt no standards as to the weight to be accorded an arbitral decision, since this
must be determined in the court's discretion with regard to the facts and circumstances
of each case. Relevant factors include the existence of provisions in the collective
bargaining agreement that conform substantially with Title VII, the degree of procedural
fairness in the arbitral forum, adequacy of the record with respect to the issue of
discrimination, and the special competence of particular arbitrators. Where an arbitral
determination gives full consideration to an employee's Title VII rights, a court may
property accord it great weight. This is especially true where the issue is solely one of
fact, specifically addressed by the parties and decided by the arbitrator on the basis of an
adequate record. But courts should ever be mindful that Congress, in enacting Title VII,
thought it necessary to provide a judicial forum for the ultimate resolution of
discriminatory employment claims. It is the duty of courts to assure the full availability
of this forum.
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In assessing arbitration as an adjudicatory process, the Supreme Court found
it to be a comparatively inappropriate forum for the final resolution of Title VII
claims." Confronting the critical distinctions between fora without rejecting
the arbitral process altogether, the Court observed:
(a) the arbitrator's role is to effectuate party intent, not the requirements
of legislation; 33
(b) the arbitrator's competence "pertains primarily to the law of the shop,
not the law of the land;"' 3' and
(c) fact finding, discovery and evidence in arbitration are not equivalent to
the judicial processes."
The federal policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes and the federal policy
against discriminatory employment practices, the Court continued, "can best be
accommodated by permitting an employee to pursue fully both his remedy under
the grievance-arbitration clause of a collective-bargaining agreement and his cause
of action under Title VII."'6 Thus, Title VII claims are entitled to a trial de
novo. 137
The Supreme Court's next encounter with statutory versus contractual rights
occurred seven years later in Barrentine v. Arkansas Best Freight Systems. 38
At issue were violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act'39 and whether
submitting the contractual claim to arbitral review foreclosed judicial action."4
The Court, with the same exacting standard of scrutiny employed in Alexander,
confirmed that a single set of facts can give rise to two separate causes of
action.' 4' Once again, the Court offered its rationale:
(a) a union may not support a statutory claim in arbitration; 42
(b) employee statutory rights may not be adequately protected in dispute
resolution; 43
(c) an arbitrator may not have the contractual authority to apply statutory
law; "
132. See id. at 56-57.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 57.
135. Id. at 57-58.
136. Id. at 59-60.
137. Id. at 60.
138. 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
139. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988).
140. Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 729.
141. Id. at 737.
142. Id. at 742.
143. Id. at 743.
144. Id. at 744.
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(d) arbitration may deprive employees of statutory rights because
arbitrators look to party intent, not enforcement of statutes; 145 and
(e) arbitrators may be powerless to fashion broad remedies.'1
With this arsenal in hand, it came as no surprise when, three years later, the
United States Supreme Court decided McDonald v. City of West Branch.147
Relying heavily on earlier decisions, the Court held that arbitration of federal
statutory and constitutional rights of the ilk that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was designed
to safeguard is not an adequate substitute for a judicial proceeding.'4 The
Court stressed the distinction: "[tihe very purpose of § 1983 was to interpose the
federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of the people's
federal rights - to protect the people from unconstitutional action under color of
state law."
49
The Court's opinion was couched in terms nonetheless supportive of
arbitration: "In addition to diminishing protection of federal rights, a rule of
preclusion might have a detrimental effect on the arbitral process."1 50
Employees who are aware of this dichotomy may elect to circumvent arbitration
altogether. 
51
Alexander and its progeny represented the law in the area of statutory rights
until the Mitsubishi trilogy.' This trilogy paved the way for the Court to
depart from its earlier holdings, and in a series of recent cases the Court decided
that agreements to arbitrate employment disputes should be enforced. 53 Despite
the views of some commentators, these decisions do not create an intersecting line
of precedent. The Court's earlier decisions, including the pivotal Alexander,
involved union contracts. In the context of collective bargaining where the union
representative negotiates contract terms directly with the employer, and employees
are bound, the Court's earlier decisions may well be justified. "4 But, these
decisions stand in stark contrast to those involving individual statutory rights and
private two-party agreements to arbitrate, and may warrant the conclusion that
different judicial analyses and results are compelled.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 744-45.
147. 466 U.S. 284 (1984).
148. Id. at 290; see 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). The Court determined that arbitration is not a
"judicial proceeding" and, therefore, the Federal Full Faith and Credit Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738
(1982), does not apply. McDonald, 466 U.S. at 292.
149. McDonald, 466 U.S. at 290 (quoting Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972)).
150. Id. at 292.
151. Id.
152. See supra note 124.
153. See infra notes 155-220 and accompanying text.
154. Henry Perritt asserts that commentators, and courts by implication, should not be too quick
to judge the potential success of arbitration of wrongful discharge claims based on the collective
bargaining experience. Perritt, supra note 5, § 3.05[2][b]. In the collective bargaining arena, the
union and employer monitor the process and can easily alter contract language if an arbitrator does
not render a favorable decision. Id. See Part V of this Article for further amplification.
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B. The Supreme Court's Pronouncement:
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.
The Court's departure from its long-standing position upholding the
separability of federal civil rights action occurred in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp.55 The United States Supreme Court, in a 7-2 decision, held that
claims arising under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(ADEA)5 6 are subject to binding arbitration. '57
As a condition of his employment, Gilmer was required to register as a
securities representative with the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). 5 ' His
registration application contained an agreement "to arbitrate any claim, dispute or
controversy.""'9 When Gilmer was terminated, he filed a charge with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission and simultaneously brought suit in district
court alleging a discriminatory discharge under ADEA. " The employer moved
to compel arbitration. 161  In denying the motion, the court, relying on
Alexander, held that employee suits under the ADEA, like actions under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, are not precluded."' The court of appeals
reversed. 16
The United States Supreme Court ruled that neither the text of the ADEA
nor its legislative history and underlying purposes precludes enforcement of an
arbitration agreement.'" The Court also clarified its prior rulings in Alexander,
Barrentine, and McDonald, confining their application to cases in the collective
155. 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991). Prior to Gilmer, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that a
claim arising under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
(1988), may be submitted to a judicial forum even though a private agreement to arbitrate exists. See
Nicholson v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 877 F.2d 221, 227-28 (3d Cir. 1989); see also Gnlmer, 111 S. Ct. at
1655. The lower court opined that Congress intended ADEA claims to be non-arbitrable since the
goals of the ADEA are incompatible with a waiver of a right to judicial forum. Nicholson, 877 F.2d
at 227-28. A First Circuit Court of Appeals decision set the stage for Nicholson. In Utley v.
Goldman Sachs & Co., 883 F.2d 184 (1st Cir. 1989), the appellate court held that a securities sales
associate who signed a Uniform Application for Securities Industry Registration or Transfer which
committed her to arbitrate any dispute between her and her firm could not be required to participate
in or to exhaust arbitration before proceeding to a judicial hearing on her federal civil rights claims
of sex discrimination and a hostile working environment. Id. at 185. In this context, the appellate
court found arbitration to be inconsistent with Title VI's congressional intent. Id. at 186; see also
Michael G. Holcomb, Note, The Demise of the FAA's "Contract of Employment" Exception?, 1992
J. Disp. RESOL. 213.
156. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634.
157. Gibner, 111 S. Ct. at 1647.
158. Id. at 1650.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1651.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1652.
164. Id. at 1652-53.
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bargaining context.' 65 With respect to Alexander specifically, the Court noted
that nothing in Alexander involved an agreement to arbitrate statutory claims and
that arbitrators were authorized by the parties to resolve only contractual, not
statutory, claims.'
An important part of the Court's opinion focused on the adequacy of
arbitration proceedings, with the Court concluding that: (1) competent, impartial
arbitrators are available in arbitration (both the NYSE and FAA protect against
biased panels); 67 and (2) lack of formal discovery with respect to discrimination
claims is not problematic since no more discovery is required in RICO or anti-
trust claims.' 6
Gilmer raised two interesting points of jurisprudence. First, the Court
entirely bypassed the FAA exclusion of employment contracts,'6 ruling that this
was an agreement between Gilmer and the NYSE, not Gilmer and his
employer. 70 Given this conclusion, it was unnecessary for the Court to decide
whether the "workers in commerce" exemption would insulate Gilmer. t '
Second, the Court stated that EEOC surveillance, an important monitoring
function of enforcement agencies, is still possible since an aggrieved individual
can file a claim with EEOC, requesting employer practices to be closely
scrutinized. m
However commendable the majority opinion, the dissent captured its
weaknesses. Justice Stevens, speaking for the minority, stated that "[t]he Court
today... skirts the antecedent question of whether the coverage of the Act even
extends to arbitration clauses contained in employment contracts, regardless of the
subject matter of the claim at issue. " " Justice Stevens reasoned that the intent
of Congress, in enacting the Federal Arbitration Act, was essentially to preclude
its application to employment disputes."'4 Gilmer was clearly such a case.
Speaking next to the congressional purpose animating the ADEA, Justice
Stevens observed that broad injunctive relief, "the cornerstone to eliminating
discrimination in society," is absent in arbitration."T It is this type of relief
which affords grievants full statutory recovery. Arbitration undermines the
165. Id. at 1656-57.
166. Id. at 1656.
167. Id. at 1654.
168. Id.
169. Section 1 of the FAA excludes from coverage "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad
employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C. §
1. This provision seemingly excludes all arbitration contracts negotiated by organized labor, but the
scope of the exclusion has been left open by the United States Supreme Court.
170. Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1651 n.2.
171. Id. at 1652 n.2.
172. Id. at 1653.
173. Id. at 1657 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1660.
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objectives of the age discrimination statute 76 and "eviscerates the important role
played by an independent judiciary in eradicating employment
discrimination. ""n
C. Gilmer's Progeny
1. Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds
Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds'78 was initially presented to the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals one year prior to Gilmer. The plaintiff in Alford, a
stockbroker, sued Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. for sex discrimination and sexual
harassment." Prior to commencing employment, Alford signed a U-4 form
requiring her to submit all employment disputes to arbitration"W When the
district court refused to compel arbitration, Dean Witter appealed.' 8 '
On appeal, Dean Witter argued that the Mitsubishi trilogy'i 2 governed the
disposition of Alford's Title VII claims."n Attempting to reconcile the strong
national policy favoring arbitration with the "equally important federal legislation
designed to combat discrimination," the court held that Alexander's rationale was
sufficiently broad to encompass all Title VII claims, irrespective of their
source.'81 But the court left room to move, in the event a different signal was
given by the United States Supreme Court: "If the issue were open to us to
evaluate afresh, we might well interpret Title VII consistent with these recent
decisions."" s Gilmer was the signal.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1661. Despite the analytical flaws of Gilmer, state courts are following its lead.
Recently, a California state appeals court ruled that claims of race discrimination in employment must
be submitted to arbitration if a private agreement to arbitrate exists. See Spellman v. Securities,
Annuities & Ins. Servs., 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 427, 430 (Ct. App. 1992). The court reasoned, "In
enacting Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act, Congress declared a national policy favoring
arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims
which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration." Id. at 431 (quoting Keating, 465 U.S.
at 10). "Gilmer and Alford stand for the proposition that important social policies and public rights
embodied in statutes prohibiting discrimination in employment can be appropriately resolved by
arbitration. The Supreme Court has determined that the arbitration forum provides sufficient
procedural safeguards and mechanisms for discovery 'to make the process suitable for discrimination
claims' under such statutes." Id. at 434 (quoting Sacks v. Richardson Greenshield Secs., 781 F.
Supp. 1475, 1483 (E.D. Cal. 1991); see also Boogher v. Stifel, Nicholaus & Co., 825 S.W.2d 27,
29 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (mandating arbitration of an age discrimination claim).
178. 905 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1990), vacated, 111 S. Ct. 2050 (1991).
179. Id. at 105.
180. See Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 547, 548 (S.D. Tex. 1989).
181. Alford, 905 F.2d at 105.
182. See supra note 124.
183. See Alford, 905 F.2d at 105.
184. Id. at 106.
185. Id.; see Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. 477; McMahon, 482 U.S. 220; and Mitsubishi, 473
U.S. 614.
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In the post-Gilmer review, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that
since Title VII and the ADEA are similar remedial civil rights statutes enforced
by the EEOC, plaintiff's Title VII claims were subject to compulsory
arbitration."" Public policy arguments, rejected by the United States Supreme
Court in Gilmer, were as swiftly and definitively rejected by the Fifth Circuit in
Alford.1 7
2. Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds
Alford was fortified by Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds.' In Willis,
plaintiff filed suit, alleging sexual harassment and sexual discrimination under
Kentucky law, breach of contract, and outrage.'" Dean Witter removed the
matter to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction and moved to compel
arbitration."' ° Subsequently, Willis amended the complaint to include a Title
VII claim."" The district court denied the motion to compel as to the civil
rights claims only, and Dean Witter appealed.'9
On appeal, Willis and the EEOC, which filed an amicus brief, presented four
pivotal arguments. First, they argued that the Supreme Court's decision in
Alexander prevented application of the arbitration provision of the Securities
Registration Form to Title VII claims."9 The Willis Court promptly disposed
of this argument by observing that the employees in Alexander did not agree to
arbitrate statutory claims."9  Second, they asserted that Title VII's regulatory
scheme, which includes EEOC oversight and enforcement, precludes a finding
that the FAA applies to Title VII claims.' This argument was similarly
rejected. ' Arbitration will not undermine the role of the EEOC in enforcing
the ADEA. " A claimant may file a claim with the EEOC even though private
judicial action is foreclosed. 9 Third, Willis and the EEOC contended that
arbitration was inappropriate for Title VII claims because of insufficient
procedural safeguards and different methods of discovery.", Gilmer, in
interpreting the same NYSE arbitration rule at issue in this case, had declined to
186. Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir. 1991), rev'g Alford, 905
F.2d 104.
187. Id. at 230.
188. 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991).
189. Id. at 306; see also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 344.040 (Baldwin 1984).
190. Willis, 948 F.2d at 306.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 307.
194. Id. at 308 (citing Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1657).
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 309 (citing Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1653).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 310.
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accept these arguments, and the Gilmer approach was embraced by the Willis
court.200
Finally, the Willis court rejected the claim that the FAA did not apply to this
case because of the "contracts of employment" exclusion clause." 1 Adopting
the Gilmer rationale, the court concluded that the securities registration form
containing the arbitration provision was not a "contract of employment"0 2 and
that arbitration of ADEA claims could be compelled.2 ' 3
3. Higgins -v. Superior Court
Gilmer was distinguished in Higgins v. Superior Court" where the
California Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's order compelling
arbitration.' Petitioners sought damages for sexual discrimination for alleged
violations of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act. 16 The
employer argued that, since all parties were members of the National Association
of Securities Dealers and petitioners had signed a form U-4 containing an
arbitration clause, the disputes should be arbitrated. 2' In response to
petitioners' argument that discrimination claims are exempt from the public policy
favoring arbitration, the trial court compelled arbitration.2"0
The California Court of Appeals held that the messages of Gilmer and Alford
are clear.2' 9 Despite the important public policies involved, disputes alleging
violations of a statutory prohibition against discrimination in employment may be
subject to arbitration as long as the agreement is covered by the FAA.210 If the
200. Id. Quoting from Gilmer directly, the court of appeals stated, "'Congress . . . did not
explicitly preclude arbitration or other non-judicial resolution of claims, even in its recent amendments
to the ADEA." Id. at 309 (quoting Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1654). "'"[l]f Congress intended the
substantive protection afforded [by the ADEA] to include protection against waiver of the right to a
judicial forum, that intention will be deducible from text or legislative history."'" Id. (quoting Gilmer,
111 S. Ct. at 1654 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 628)) (alterations by Gilmer court).
201. Id. at 310.
202. Id. at 312. This decision was preceded by an exhaustive review of the FAA's legislative
history. See id. at 310-12. The Act was drafted initially to counter judicial animosity toward
arbitration and to overturn the common-law rule which precluded enforcement of agreements to
arbitrate in commercial contracts. See id. at 311. Congress deliberately "limited the scope of the Act
by creating a category of contracts not subject to the Act's strictures." Id. (citing Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)). The court recognized that
collective bargaining agreements and individual employment contracts are contracts of employment
which fall outside the scope of the FAA. Id. (citing Bacashihua v. United States Postal Serv., 859
F.2d 402, 404-05 (6th Cir. 1988)).
203. Id. at 312.
204. 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 57 (Ct. App. 1991).
205. Id. at 63.
206. Id. at 58; see CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12900-12996 (West 1992).
207. Higgins, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 58.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 62.
210. Id.
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agreement is covered by the FAA, any conflicting state law is preempted.2 '
However, the court ruled that the agreement in this case was significantly
different from the one in Gilmer.2"2 Here, the rule concerned "Industry and
Clearing Controversies. "213 The Alabama Supreme Court had previously
interpreted this rule in A. G. Edwards & Sons v. Clark,2"4 limiting its application
to disputes related to the securities industry." 5 The fact that defendant was
employed by a securities firm, according to the Alabama Supreme Court, did not
mean that every tort created an arbitrable "Industry" or "Clearing"
controversy. 26
Petitioners in Higgins agreed to arbitrate industry and clearing disputes
arising out of or in connection with business transactions. 17 "They did not
agree to arbitrate . . . employment disputes."2' The court reasoned that no
reasonable person would suspect that an agreement to arbitrate business disputes
would be interpreted to include discrimination disputes.21 9 As a matter of law,
the arbitration clause did not encompass such claims.'
211. Id.
212. Id. at 63.
213. Id.
214. 558 So. 2d 358 (Ala. 1990).
215. Id. at 363.
216. Id. at 362.
217. Higgins, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 63.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. Gilmer and its progeny were recently extended to the non-discrimination area. In Saari
v. Smith, Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 968 F.2d 877, 878-79 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
494 (1992), an account executive employed by a brokerage firm, terminated for refusing to take a
polygraph examination, filed an action in federal district court alleging a violation of the Employee
Polygraph Protection Act (EPPA). See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2009 (1988). The brokerage firm filed
a motion to compel arbitration, relying on a signed U-4 form and conditions of employment. Saari,
968 F.2d at 879. In denying the employer's motion, the district court cited a Third Circuit decision,
Nicholson v. CPC International, Inc., 877 F.2d 221, which assured court access to persons claiming
violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634; Saari, 968 F.2d
at 879. On appeal, Saari attempted to distinguish Gilmer by arguing the flexibility of the ADEA in
resolving claims through "conciliation, conference and persuasion." Saari, 968 F.2d at 880. The
court of appeals rejected this argument and stated that "the fact that a particular statute embodies a
judicial enforcement process does not exclude arbitration." Id. at 881.
The court also rejected Saari's argument that the anti-waiver provision of the EPPA is different,
with the language, rights and procedures requiring judicial resolution of disputes. See id. at 881-82.
"This rationale does not stand in light of Gilmer .... The term 'procedures' is too broad to relate
solely to forum selection." Id. at 881. Furthermore, substantive rights enforced by arbitration are
identical to those enforced in a judicial forum. Id. at 882.
Saari raised two additional, unique claims of non-arbitrability which, in turn, the appellate court
dismissed. First, Saari claimed that his dispute was outside the scope of NYSE Rule 347 since his
conduct did not implicate customers, handling of accounts, or performance as a broker. Id. The court
responded by noting that the plain language of Rule 347 was broad, and encompassed essentially "any
controversy between a registered representative and a member or member organization arising out of
the employment or termination of employment." Id. at 883. Second, state polygraph and slander laws
were found non-controlling. Id. The polygraph law at issue did not determine whether the claim
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V. THE DEBATE BETWEEN THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL
VERSUS ARBITRATION
Traditional labor arbitration, a product of World War II, proliferated in the
aftermath of the war, a period when the union movement grew in geometric
progression to the establishment of federal labor laws favoring collective
representation.22' Initially adopted as a quid pro quo for the strike weapon of
employers, arbitration became firmly embedded in the collective bargaining
process. Sparked by the passage of the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, judicial
support for arbitration was confirmed by the United States Supreme Court in the
Steelworkers Trilogy.2'
The Steelworkers Trilogy model of labor arbitration gradually penetrated the
public sector. Today, virtually all collective bargaining agreements in the private
and public sectors contain arbitration as part of the formal grievance
machinery. m Arbitration is considered the last and final step; resort to courts
is rare.
Although support for traditional labor arbitration on all levels remains solid,
the retrenchment of the labor movement will produce fewer cases eligible for
arbitration.' Concomitantly, non-union work place disputes will rise. Can
the success of arbitration in the conventional collective milieu be extended to the
non-union sector without adversely affecting the arbitrability presumptions carved
out by the United States Supreme Court? This section examines whether the
current tide of aggressively incorporating arbitration clauses into employer
should be arbitrated or adjudicated in federal court. Id The court held that where a state law's
preference for a judicial form interferes with the choice expressed by Congress in the FAA, it is pre-
empted. Id. The slander claim directly related to Saari's job as a broker and was thus subject to the
arbitration provisions of his contract. Id. "The Supreme Court... has repeatedly told us that the
Federal Arbitration Act manifests a liberal policy favoring arbitration agreements." Id.
221. FRANK ELKouRI & EDNA A. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 3 (4th ed. 1985);
FAIRWEATHER'S PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN LABOR ARBITRATION 1-9 (Ray J. Schoonhoven ed.,
3d ed. 1991).
222. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers
of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). In a single paragraph, the Supreme
Court captured the very essence of the arbitral process:
[A]rbitration is the substitute for industrial strife. Since arbitration of labor disputes has
quite different functions from arbitration under an ordinary commercial agreement, the
hostility evinced by courts toward arbitration of commercial agreements has no place
here. For arbitration of labor disputes under collective bargaining agreements is part and
parcel of the collective bargaining process itself.
Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 578.
223. Theodore St. Antoine, The Legal Framework of Labor Arbitration in the Private Sector, in
LABOR ARBrRATION: A PRAcTICAL GUIDE TO ADVOCATES 18, 18 (Max Zimny et al. eds., 1990).
224. Fewer than eight percent of the cases on the Supreme Court's docket in 1992 involved labor
relations, compared with the 20-25 percent of the 1960s. THE WORLD ALMANAC 180 (Mark S.
Huffman ed., 1992). Today, collective bargaining covers less than 25 percent of private employment.
Id. In 1990, union membership was 16.1 percent. Id. It has decreased in each succeeding year. Id.
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handbooks and personnel manuals directly confronts the Seventh Amendment's
jury trial requirement, clashes with other constitutional pronouncements or creates
an impermissible tension between protective labor legislation and employee rights.
A. The Nature of "Individual" and Collective Bargaining
The dynamics of non-union arbitration are markedly different than those
which were recognized by the United States Supreme Court in the Steelworkers
Trilogy. m In an erudite assessment of this distinction, Professor Estreicher
observes:
To extend the special status that arbitration enjoys under the Trilogy -
the twin features of a virtually all-inclusive presumption of arbitrability
and a sharply limited role for the courts - to settings where collective
bargaining does not take place would be to divorce the court's doctrine
from its underlying justification, its mooring in a particular institution
of industrial government premised on collective representation of
workers and joint labor-management determination of basic terms and
conditions of employment. 6
Professor Estreicher's points are well-taken. 7  The success arbitration
enjoys in the union sector is attributable to several factors: the parties'
willingness to accept an arbitral award in lieu of a strike 8 and the industrial
harmony which emanates from the parties' ability to enforce their rights through
the grievance mill. "The norms governing the arbitrator's award are shaped by
the bargaining history of the parties and the web of informal practices that serve
to give flesh to the bare bones of the contract - what Justice Douglas referred
to as 'the common law of the shop. ' " ' If parties disfavor an award, they can
bargain away its terms or ramifications during the next round of negotiations.?
225. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
226. Samuel Estreicher, Arbitration of Employment Disputes Without Unions, 66 CHI.-KENT L.
REv. 753, 758 (1990).
227. Professor Estreicher describes the models of work place arbitration in different institutional
settings. Id. at 757. First, typified by the Steelworkers Trilogy, the Supreme Court's federal law of
collective bargaining creates a framework for parties to use arbitration exclusively and "sharply
restricts access to the courts except where in aid of the process." Id. Second, arbitration is merely
a substitute for adjudication in a public forum, a process administered by courts or private
administrative agencies. Id. at 760.
228. Congress has indicated that "'[flinal adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is
• . . the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or
interpretation of an existing collective bargaining agreement.'" Buffalo Forge Co. v. United
Steelworkers of Am., 428 U.S. 397, 411-12 (1976) (quoting Labor Management Act, 29 U.S.C. §
173(d) (1970)).
229. Estreicher, supra note 226, at 759; see also Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute
Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HAav. L. REv. 668, 681 (1986).
230. Estreicher, supra note 226, at 759.
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Ultimately, "the cultivation of collective bargaining [and all permutations] is not
merely an abstract matter of freedom for the worker but rather a concrete
foundation for the general welfare.""3
Are the dynamics in the union sector sufficiently dissimilar to those in the
non-union sector to warrant a different treatment of general employment disputes?
Perhaps. After Toussaint, many employers unilaterally adopted grievance
procedures which limited an employee's right to grieve wrongful discharge or
disciplinary issues through arbitration. Under this procedure, the intended
beneficiary, the employee, is no less bound by the grievance procedure than a
bargaining unit member subject to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement.
But the crucial difference between the two may well lie in the union member's
ability, through the negotiating team, to create a contract through conference,
discussion, and, at times, hard core bargaining. This "give and take" of the
collective bargaining process is a facet noticeably absent in the non-union sector.
However, as Professor Estreicher advances, this distinction does not mean
that arbitration cannot assume and retain a viable role in the resolution of non-
union employment disputes. 2  Acceptability by courts, employers and private
employees will depend on how arbitration is structured. In this vein, the
procedural fairness of arbitration assumes a particular saliency. As the Michigan
Supreme Court found in Renny v. Port Huron Hospital," an employer may
avoid jury review of an employee's termination under a just cause termination
contract by establishing an alternative dispute resolution system.' But if such
a system is prescribed, the procedures must comply with elementary fairness
requirements.' 5 These requirements include:
(1) Adequate notice to persons who are bound by the adjudication;
(2) The right to present evidence and arguments and the fair opportunity
to rebut evidence and arguments by the opposing party;
(3) A formulation of issues of law and facts in terms of the application of
rules with respect to specified parties concerning a specific transaction,
situation, or status;
(4) A rule specifying the point in the proceeding when a final decision is
rendered; and
(5) Other procedural elements as may be necessary to ensure the means to
determine the matter in question. These will be determined by the
complexity of the matter in question, the urgency with which the matter
231. Clyde W. Summers, Labor Law as the Century Turns: A Changing of the Guard, 67 NEB.
L. REv. 7, 9 n.9 (1988) (quoting JOSEPH HUTMACHER, SENATOR ROBERT F. WAGNER AND THE RISE
OF URBAN LIBERALISM 195, 203-04 (1968)).
232. Estreicher, supra note 226, at 760.
233. 398 N.W.2d 327 (Mich. 1986).
234. Id. at 336.
235. Id. at 338.
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must be resolved and the opportunity of the parties to obtain evidence
and to formulate legal conclusions.2
The court concluded that a unilaterally imposed grievance procedure which
lacks these elements does not meet the elementary fairness requirement.23
The few isolated cases which address the issue of fairness in arbitration
demonstrate the importance of preserving trial safeguards. The loss of certain
procedures, e.g., the right to retain counsel, to cross-examine witnesses, and to
discover essential documents, will upset the delicate balance of rights which the
drafters of civil and statutory rights legislation sought to create and will likely
trigger a veto over the entire ADR procedure.
B. The FAA Exclusion - A Salient Omission
A complete analysis of the appropriateness of arbitration in the non-union
employment context invariably involves the FAA exclusion. This act, which
applies to arbitrations concerning transactions in enterprises engaged in or
affecting interstate commerce and any maritime transaction, excludes from its
scope "contracts of employment of seaman, railroad employees, or any other class
of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce."2 31
In enacting such far-reaching legislation, Congress was inspired by the need
to ensure the enforcement of commercial arbitration agreements which at common
law could be revoked. 9 So preoccupied have courts been with this aspect of
the FAA that they have given short shrift to the exclusionary clause set forth in
Section 1 of the Act. Since the 1950s, judicial opinions have "applied the
exception to workers directly involved in the interstate movement of physical
objects."' However, in Gilmer, the United States Supreme Court skirted the
236. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 83(2), 84(3)(b) (1982)); see also
Khalifa v. Henry Ford Hosp., 401 N.W.2d 884, 890-91 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986). In Khalifa, another
panel of the Michigan Court of Appeals, employing Toussaint, concluded that a fair grievance
procedure incorporated into an employee manual may culminate in summary judgment in favor of the
employer. Khalifa, 401 N.W.2d at 890-91. The court decided that procedures which do not comport
with elementary fairness will nullify arbitration and require the case to be submitted to a jury to
determine if the employee was terminated for just cause. Id.; Vander Toon v. City of Grand Rapids,
348 N.W.2d 697, 702 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (the decision of a five-member commission upholding
the plaintiff's termination was not impartial because this commission also participated in the decision
to terminate plaintiff's employment).
237. Renny, 398 N.W.2d at 338.
238. 9 U.S.C. § 1.
239. Id. § 2.
240. Jeffrey W. Stempel. Reconsidering the Employment Contract Exclusion in Section 1 of the
Federal Arbitration Act: Correcting the Judiciary's Failure of Statutory Vision, 1991 J. DiSP. RESOL.
259, 263; see also Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064, 1069 (2d Cir. 1972)
(basketball player does not fall within the exceptions created by Section 1 of the Act); Tenney Eng'g
v. United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers Local 437, 207 F.2d 450, 453 (3d Cir. 1953) (plaintiffs
engaged in the production of goods for subsequent sale in interstate commerce are not a class of
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exclusion in a less prudential way, declaring that the arbitration clause was not
contained in a contract of employment: The FAA requires that the arbitration
clause being enforced be in writing.... [T]he arbitration clause at issue is in
Gilmer's securities registration application, which is a contract with the securities
exchanges, not with Interstate.l
The Gilmer Court's refusal to confront the exclusionary clause issue has
produced a firestorm of criticism:
The Court's invocation of "plain language" despite the absurdity of
result provides a neat way for the Gilmer majority to avoid considering
the other factors thought to be integral to intelligent statutory
interpretation: legislative history; specific legislative intent; overall
legislative purpose; evolutionary influences on law and society; the
distribution of power within the political system; and (in close cases)
the "better" rule.2
Notwithstanding the Court's failure to address the meaning of Section 1,
recent opinions of federal district courts have emphatically repudiated a broad
interpretation of the exclusion clause. 3 The rationale which undergirds this
posture was best articulated in Dancu v. Coopers & Lybrand,' where the court
stated that if Section 1 were "intended to exempt all contracts of employment, the
drafters easily and almost certainly would explicitly have so stated without
qualification."24 Until the Supreme Court adopts a clear perspective on the
intent and meaning of the clause, eclectic results will be the norm.
C. Constitutional Impediments - Fact or Fiction?
1. Trial by Jury
The right to a jury trial in civil cases is preserved by the Seventh
Amendment of the United States Constitution and extended to all but two states
workers engaged in interstate commerce within the meaning of Section 1 of the Act).
241. Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1651 n.2. The Court stated that lower courts have uniformly
concluded that the exclusionary clause in Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act is inapplicable to
arbitration clauses if inserted in registration applications. Id.
242. Stempel, supra note 240, at 276-77; see also Vicki M. Young, The Gilmer Decision, 16
LAw. ARB. LETrER 1 (Fall 1992); Jennifer A. Clifton, Note, The Right to Sue vs. The Agreement to
Arbitrate: The Dilemma in Title VII Cases, 1991 J. DisP. RESOL. 407.
243. See, e.g., Bender v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 789 F. Supp. 155 (D.N.J. 1992).
244. 778 F. Supp. 832 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
245. Id. at 834.
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through parallel provisions of state constitutions.6 The Seventh Amendment
provides: "In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved .... "247
Commentators agree that the litmus test of whether a cause-of-action in
federal court implicates a jury trial is historical,' qualifying litigants to argue
to a jury only if permitted to do so under the common law of England during the
Constitution's ratification. 249 Legal claims which are subject to mandatory or
contractual arbitration appear, at least facially, to violate the Seventh
Amendment's jury trial requirement.' Those who subscribe to this view assert
that arbitration is not the functional equivalent of a jury trial or, in any event,
arbitration is not a civil proceeding as contemplated by court rules and
statutes."' Opponents of ADR further assert that even the summary jury trial,
which comes close in concept to a jury trial, is noticeably distinct and does not
satisfy constitutional standards.52
246. See Fleming James, Jr., Right to a Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655 (1963);
see also PERRrrT, supra note 5, § 3.03[4]. Colorado and Louisiana are the only states which do not
guarantee the right of a jury trial in civil cases. State constitutions may contain slightly different
language. For example, the pertinent language in the Oklahoma constitution is: "The right of trial
by jury shall be and remain inviolate .... " OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 19. This creates interpretational
differences between the Seventh Amendment and state constitutional guarantees which the reader
should be cognizant of in assessing the impact, if any, on the right to trial by jury and whether
arbitration offends the reach of its protection.
247. U.S. CoNsr. amend. VII.
248. Dwight Golann, Making Alternative Dispute Resolution Mandatory: The Constitutional
Issues, 68 OR. L. REV. 487, 502 (1989).
249. See id. at 502-03.
250. Most cases which have addressed the mandatory (compulsory) use of ADR have focused on
the permissibility of diversion programs - at what point in the trial should this preliminary but not
exclusive step be imposed? In Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1 (1899), the Supreme Court
held that Congress had "considerable discretion" to require a case to be tried before a justice of the
peace as long as the right to pursue a jury trial later was not "unreasonably obstructed." Id. at 44-45.
In Rhea v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 767 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1985), the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that a local mediation rule did not offend the protections of the Seventh Amendment where resort
to a trial de novo exists. Id. at 268. Arbitration in both contexts was used as a prelude to trial. In
Gilmer, and clearly in the collective bargaining context, arbitration is not a supplement.to trial.
Indeed, it is the trial - a contractual arrangement, not mandated but merely enforced by legislation.
Thus far, the Supreme Court has not shown any eagerness to preserve a litigant's access to courts
except where the underlying action involves a fundamental right. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut,
401 U.S. 371 (1971) (fundamental right to marry).
251. See Varga v. Heritage Hosp., 362 N.W.2d 282, 282 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (refusing to
recognize arbitration as an action which tolled the statute of limitations because it was a non-judicial
proceeding).
252. The summary jury trial permits parties to present summary versions of their cases to a judge
or magistrate before a jury of six persons. The jury returns a non-binding verdict and is permitted
to offer feedback on the strengths and weaknesses of the case. The summary jury trial does not affect
the parties' right to a trial on the merits. See generally Charles W. Hatfield, The Summary Jury Trial:
Who Will Speak for the Jurors, 1991 J. Disp. RESOL. 151, 152-55 (providing a background of the
summary jury trial).
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But this perspective is not well-founded. First, in arbitration, live witnesses
appear before an arbitrator much like witnesses appear before a judge or jury.
Truncated or artificial time lines are not imposed. Cross-examination, rebuttal,
and closing arguments are permitted. While arbitration offers no formal rules or
guidelines for conducting discovery, parties are not prevented from obtaining
necessary information. Administrative conferences and preliminary hearings can
be used to facilitate adequate discovery. Also, arbitrators have the authority to
require production of documents and other evidence. 23 A full airing of the
dispute is not only possible but far more likely to occur. Most importantly,
arbitration of wrongful discharge claims is usually not mandatory - in other
words dictated by statute. It is merely permitted and regulated by statute, and
enforced through the appropriate judicial channel.
Thus, the question of whether the right to a trial by jury is absolute or even
fundamental remains clearly open to analysis. 4 Assuming the right is either
absolute or fundamental, the principal inquiry is whether this right can be waived?
In Moore v. Fragatos,"5 the Michigan Court of Appeals held that arbitration
agreements, at least in the medical context,5 6 constitute a waiver of a patient's
constitutional right to a jury trial, and such a waiver must be made knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily. 7 For a waiver to be knowing, the "record must
affirmatively show that the plaintiff was aware that he was signing an arbitration
agreement. 58  The court posited that a presumption against waiver of a
constitutional right, which is based on a rational inference from the facts, is
weightier than the presumption that a person has read what he has signed. 2 9
Accordingly, the first presumption must prevail. 2" As to whether the waiver
is intelligent, the court observed that "[iun order to make an intelligent choice, a
253. 9 U.S.C. § 7; UNIF. ARBITRATION ACr § 7, 7 U.L.A. 4 (1985).
254. No court has yet to rule on this specific issue.
255. 321 N.W.2d 781 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
256. Under the Michigan Medical Arbitration Act, MICH CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.5040-.5065
(West 1987), insured hospitals, HMO's, clinics, and sanitoria offer patients the option to sign an
agreement to arbitrate malpractice disputes. Id. § 600.5041(1). The patient is also given an
information booklet that details the arbitration agreement and explains that by choosing arbitration,
the patient forgoes jury trial rights. See id. § 600.5041(6). Signing the agreement is not a
prerequisite to health care. See id. § 600.5041(2). A patient may revoke a signed agreement within
60 days of discharge. See id. § 600.5041(3). Should a dispute arise, the parties mutually select a
three member panel to hear the evidence. See id. § 600.5044. The panel is comprised of an attorney,
a member of the public, and a physician or hospital administrator. Id. § 600.5044(2). The attorney
chairs the panel. Id. The panel's decision is final and binding. See id. § 600.5054. The Act has
withstood attacks on the composition of the arbitration panel and on the waiver of jury trial rights.
See e.g., Morris v. Metriyakool, 344 N.W.2d 736 (Mich. 1984).
257. Moore, 321 N.W.2d at 785. The court readily acknowledged that this standard, used in the
context of a criminal proceeding, may not apply to a civil proceeding. Id. But in the civil area,
'courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver." Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S.
389, 393 (1937).
258. Moore, 321 N.W.2d at 786.
259. Id.
260. Id.
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person must be informed of the consequences of the decision: i.e. the material
difference between . . . arbitration and trial in civil court."26'
The import of this decision was severely undercut by the Michigan Supreme
Court several years later in McKinstry v. Valley Obstetrics-Gynecology Clinic,p. C:162
We disagree with the holding of Moore v. Fragatos, to the extent it
places the burden on the defendant to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the plaintiff, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right
to court access.
We do not infuse constitutional concerns equivalent to those in a
criminal proceeding into a civil litigant's contractual choice-of-forum
decision.2'
The McKinstry court continued that "[a] party's voluntary decision to
arbitrate neither involves the complete relinquishment of a constitutional right nor
raises the specter of procedural due process violations. "26
This analysis may be confined to state courts. On the federal level, an
extensive array of factors is used to determine whether a contractual waiver of the
right to a jury trial is "knowing and voluntary."' Among the factors the
federal courts consider are:
(1) whether the parties possessed equal bargaining power;2
(2) whether the waiver provision was a bargained-for provision of the
agreement; 267
261. Id. Material differences include reference to giving up the right to trial by jury or judge,
description of the arbitration panel, and the voluntary nature of final and binding arbitration. Id. at
786-87. Despite the Moore court's unequivocal pronouncement that access to the court system is a
fundamental right under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, see id. at 784-85 & n.3, the court was
equally adamant that a person is entitled to select the forum and tribunal in which a dispute should be
resolved. See id. at 791-92.
262. 405 N.W.2d 88 (Mich. 1987).
263. Id. at 95.
264. Id. The Court has made clear that the United States Constitution does not confer a federal
constitutional right to trial by jury in state court civil cases. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189
(1974); see also U.S. CONST. amend. VII. Also, the Michigan Constitution provides, in pertinent
part, "the right of trial by jury shall remain, but shall be waived in all civil cases unless demanded
by one of the parties in the manner prescribed by law." MICH. CONST. art. I, § 14. "The right to
a jury trial in a civil action is therefore permissive, not absolute." McKinstry, 405 N.W.2d at 95.
265. See generally A. Darby Dickerson, Contractual Jury Waiver Provisions, A Striking Idea,
39 FEDERAL B. NEws & J. 206 (1992).
266. See Telum, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton Credit Corp., 859 F.2d 835, 837 (10th Cir. 1988) (no
disparity in bargaining power existed between two sophisticated parties).
267. See Dreiling v. Peugeot Motors of Am., 539 F. Supp. 402, 403 (D. Colo. 1982) (defendants
failed to present evidence that the contract's waiver provision was a bargained-for term or was even
brought to plaintiff's attention).
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(3) whether the agreement was subject to negotiation;2" and
(4) whether the waiver provision was conspicuous.2'
These factors demonstrate that parties must use care when drafting and
placing waiver provisions in contracts. Federal courts are unlikely to find a
waiver was made knowingly and voluntarily if the clause is inconspicuous or
displays an inequity in bargaining power between the parties.
2. Due Process and 'State Action'
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits state deprivation of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law.27 The United States Supreme Court has
employed a three-part analysis to determine whether a due process violation
exists:
(1) a deprivation by the state or a private person who may be fairly treated
as the state;
(2) of a constitutionally cognizable life, liberty, or property interest;
(3) without due process of law.27'
The state action element of this analysis admits of no easy response; state
action cannot be assumed.217 Moreover, a state's mere acquiescence in a
private action will not convert it into state action. 2" Instead, the Supreme
Court has identified three situations which confirm the existence of state action:
(1) The "state action"/"private action" nexus is formed when the challenged
conduct "has sufficiently received the imprimatur of the State so as to
268. See Fairfield Leasing v. Techni-Graphics, 607 A.2d 703, 706 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1992) (where a non-negotiated jury waiver clause appears inconspiciously in a standard contract
entered into without assistance of counsel, a waiver should not be enforced).
269. See National Equip. Rental v. Hendrix, 565 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1977) (a waiver clause
set deeply and inconspicuously in a contract fails to overcome the presumption that right to jury trial
was waived).
270. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
271. See, e.g., Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284-85 (1980).
272. District of Columbia v. Canter, 409 U.S. 418, 423 (1973). "Mhe commands of the
Fourteenth Amendment are addressed only to the State or those acting under color of its authority."
Id. Until there is a finding of state action, the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment
remain segregated from analysis. Id.
273. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 356-57 (1974). In Jackson, the
Supreme Court stated: "Approval by a state utility commission of. . . a request from a regulated
utility, where the commission has not put its own weight on the side of the proposed practice by
ordering it, does not transmute a practice initiated by the utility and approved by the commission into
'state action.'" Id. (emphasis added).
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make it 'state' action for the purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment."274
(2) The challenged "private" conduct involves the exercise of powers that
are "traditionally exclusively reserved to the State."275
(3) The challenged conduct necessitates a "symbiotic relationship" between
the state and the private party.276
In following the precedent established by the United States Supreme Court
on the scope of federal constitutional rights, it is clear that arbitration of wrongful
dismissal claims does not implicate state action. "[Elxercise of a choice allowed
by state law where the initiative comes from it and not from the State, does not
make its action in doing so, state action for purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment."' Arbitration typically would fail this test since the state's role
is permissive, not prominent or persuasive.27 Certainly, it is not a traditionally
exclusive governmental function. "While many functions have been traditionally
performed by governments, very few have been 'exclusively reserved to the
State.'"279 Private civil dispute resolution is not a traditionally exclusively
governmental function for which the States' acquiescence may be classified as
performance by private parties, thus constituting state action. The deprivation
occurs because of a private decision which does not constitute the performance
of a governmental function.2"u
274. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1003 (1982).
275. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 352.
276. Id. at 357; see also Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961). In
Burton, the Supreme Court held that a state parking authority which relied on a restaurant which
served whites only made itself a party to the refusal of service through its inaction. Burton, 365 U.S.
at 725. Because of the state's interdependence with the restaurant, "it must be recognized as a joint
participant in the challenged activity." Id.
277. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 357.
278. States providing for arbitration do not usually compel parties to arbitrate their employment
disputes. Rather, states, in line with strong federal authority, have announced the circumstances under
which courts will not interfere with private contractual agreements to arbitrate. Once an employee
signs a form and agrees to submit any employment dispute to arbitration, the state's enforcement
function does not transmute it to "state action." It retains its private character.
279. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 158 (1978) (quoting Jackson, 419 U.S. at 352).
Even if the state were to subsidize arbitration, it is doubtful that a "symbiotic relationship" could be
established. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1003 (1982) (nursing home decisions to alter the
level of care received by Medicaid patients does not involve state action despite the fact that the state
has an interest in and oversees the nursing home determinations).
280. Since arbitration is conducted without judicial supervision or with limited oversight, a
question often raised is whether alternate dispute resolution, such as arbitration, violates the Article
III separation of powers clause of the United States Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. m], § 1. State.
constitutions contain similar limitations to ensure that judicial authority is not delegated to non-judges.
Article III "safeguards the role of the Judicial Branch .. .by barring congressional attempts 'to
transfer jurisdiction [to non-article m] tribunals] for the purpose of emasculating' constitutional courts
...thereby preventing the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the
other." Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850 (1986) (quoting National
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 644 (1949) (Vinson, C.J., dissenting)); see
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VI. CONCLUSION
Evolved from relatively innocuous beginnings, common law modification of
the employment-at-will rule is now well-entrenched. Following the paradigmatic
model established in the union sector, judicial opinions have attempted to redress
imbalances in bargaining power between employee and employer. While
superimposing a structure which limits employer autonomy to discharge freely and
without legal consequence, courts, fearful of usurping their constitutional
mandate, have been reluctant to carve out a just cause requirement.
In the face of divergent judicial perspectives, it is inevitable that legislation
to solidify pro-employee gains will again be considered. Perritt credits a 1976
law review article which proposes a wrongful discharge statute "because of
pessimism about the capacity of the common law to effect needed changes in the
employment-at-will doctrine" as part of the stimulus for the common law
revolution of the 1980s.28 ' While legislative efforts remain spotty, the Montana
statute, in tandem with the Uniform Employment Termination Act adopted by the
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, demonstrates that the political climate
indeed is changing and that passage of either a federal statute, or state statutes as
expansive as Montana's, though not imminent, will likely occur in the next
decade.2 2
Finally, whether the goal of protecting employee rights is realized through
the traditional legislative process or not, it is clear that the United States Supreme
Court has set the tone for adjudicating wrongful discharge claims with
discrimination underpinnings. While some commentators remain adamant that the
use of arbitration "centrally confronts the jury trial right "21 or implicates other
constitutional safeguards, others are not so convinced. Despite its analytical
shortcomings, in the aftermath of Gilmer, appellate courts have favored the use
of arbitration as the exclusive remedy in suits involving statutory claims. Until
the Supreme Court decides to rule conclusively on the FAA exception, this trend
is likely to continue.
also Golann, supra note 248, at 521-24. Even assuming that this type of jurisdictional turf war exists,
Golann, for example, takes the analysis one step further and argues that because arbitrators are not
required to follow any particular legal standards of decision, and their decisions are outside the general
purview of judicial scrutiny, statutes enacted to protect individual rights may lose their potency. See
Golann, supra note 248, at 522-23. The analysis offered in the last part of this Article suggests that
arbitrators are not impervious to substantive standards embodied in legislation, that they do not fall
prey to "arm-twisting settlement devices," and that they do not issue decisions which "conform to
popular trends." Id. at 523. Furthermore, Golann's arguments are confined to mandatory, not
contractual, arbitration. See id. at 495.
281. PERRTrr, supra note 10, § 3.03, at 3-18 (citing Clyde W. Summers, Individual Protection
Against Unfair Dismissal Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481 (1976)).
282. See supra notes 64-66, 71-72 and accompanying text.
283. Perritt, supra note 10, § 3.05, at 3-37.
19931
HeinOnline -- 1993 J. Disp. Resol. 151 1993
HeinOnline -- 1993 J. Disp. Resol. 152 1993
